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TAKE THIS JOB AND SHOVE IT: 
THE PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY OF JOHNNY PAYCHECK 
AND A PRAYER FOR STRICT LIABILITY IN APPALACHIA 
EUGENE “TREY” MOORE III* 
“I been workin’ in this factory 
For nigh on fifteen years 
All this time I watched my woman 
Drownin’ in a pool of tears 
And I’ve seen a lot of good folks die 
That had a lot of bills to pay 
I’d give the shirt right offa’ my back 
If I had the guts to say 
Take this job and shove it 
I ain’t working here no more” 
—Johnny Paycheck, Take This Job and Shove It, 1977 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
Appalachia developed over millions of years creating a unique 
watershed pouring forth crystal clear water to both the Eastern seaboard 
above the New River and the headwaters of the Ohio and Kentucky 
Rivers feeding the Mississippi.1  Appalachia is one of the oldest, most 
 
* St. Mary’s University School of Law, J.D. Candidate, May 2018; Texas State University, 
M.F.A., 2010; University of Texas at Austin, B.A. 1995.  This Comment is the genesis of many 
incredible risks, chances, and connections.  In 2009, I proposed a writing workshop project to Judy 
Bonds of Coal River Mountain Watch.  She in turn passed along my proposal to Jerry Hardt of 
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth and Larry Gibson of Keeper of the Mountains Foundation.  I 
eventually conducted over fifty hours of oral history interviews in Kentucky and West Virginia:  
Teri Blanton, McKinley Sumner, Cody Montgomery, Stanley Sturgill, Rick Handshoe, and Chuck 
Nelson to name a few.  Their passion, knowledge, and love for Appalachia and their culture left an 
indelible impression.  I wrote this Comment on the foundation of their stories.  Their prayers for 
help whisper through my mind on any given day.  I humbly offer this Comment to them in 
appreciation for the open doors and food offered at their tables.  Teri, I never gave up and thank 
you for your friendship.  I thank my family, Gene Moore, Carol Moore, Amber, Canaan, Emanuel, 
and Ellie Felice, for their support and encouragement; without you none of this would be possible 
or worth it.  “Let not mercy and truth forsake thee; bind them about thy neck; write them upon the 
table of thine heart.”—Proverbs 3:3. 
1. See Wilma Dykeman, Appalachian Mountains, ENCYCLOÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Appalachian-Mountains [https://perma.cc/B6S3-TAER] (last 
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biodiverse ecosystems in the world2 with intermittent and perennial 
springs flowing near every valley.3  Many rural landowners exclusively 
use water from private wells.4  Some landowners lease their property to 
mining companies to extract the rich layers of underground coal.5   
Most coal companies in Appalachia mine coal through a process 
known as surface mining or strip mining.6  First, all of the trees are cut 
down, and topsoil is bulldozed into nearby valleys until the subsurface 
lays bare.7  The shale and sandstone resting above the coal is blown up 
 
updated June. 22, 2017) (describing physical features, climate, plant and animal life, the people and 
economy, and study of the Appalachian Mountains). 
2. See Trey Moore (Treuwulf), Cody Montgomery & Appalachia, YOUTUBE (Mar. 14, 
2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QwstygvZCBo [hereinafter Cody Montgomery] 
(discussing the biodiversity in Appalachia).  
3. See A Stream Classification System for the Appalachian LCC, APPALACHIAN 
LANDSCAPE CONSERVATION COOPERATIVE, http://applcc.org/research/applcc-funded-projects/ 
final-narrative-stream_classification (last visited Sept.  15, 2017) (following “Stream Classification 
Story Map” hyperlink; then “Access this Story Map . . . “ hyperlink for the interactive article).  
4. See John G. Shiber, Arsenic in Domestic Well Water and Health in Central Appalachia, 
USA, 160 WATER, AIR, AND SOIL POLLUTION 327, 335, 337–38 (2005) (stating 90% of rural 
Kentucky relies on private wells and springs, “and groundwater is a source for [forty-eight percent] 
of the state’s public water” supply).  56% of West Virginians rely on groundwater, and 77% of 
Ohio’s population depends on groundwater.  Id. at 335; Jessica Lilly, Glynis Board & Roxy Todd, 
Inside Appalachia: Water in the Coalfields, W. VA. PUB. BROAD. (Jan. 16, 2015), 
http://wvpublic.org/post/inside-appalachia-water-coalfields#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/4ZEY-
N2GR] (explaining the use of private wells in the area); see also InsideAppalachia: Water in the 
Coalfields, SOUNDCLOUD, https://soundcloud.com/wvpublicnews/insideappalachiacoalfieldwater 
[https://perma.cc/DY3E-4FV4] (last visited Sept. 19, 2017). 
5. Tom D. Miller, Absentees Dominate Land Ownership, THE HERALD-ADVERTISER & THE 
HERALD-DISPATCH, reprinted in WHO OWNS WEST VIRGINIA? 2 (Huntington Publishing Co., 
1974). 
6. See Trey Moore (Treuwulf), Stanley Sturgill:  Black Mountain and Mountain Top 
Removal, YOUTUBE (May 15, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8N3lUOt4FU 
(explaining the mountain removal process by mining companies from the perspective of a 
community battling to save its water resources).  
7.   
‘[V]alley fills’ are constructed from and used to dispose of the spoil or coal mine waste material 
generated during mining operations. The fills are constructed by filling a designated portion of a 
valley with spoil or waste material.  Fills that are constructed at the beginning of a valley are called 
‘head-of-hollow fills.’  
W. Va. Coal Ass’n v. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. 1276, 1281 (S.D. W.Va. 1989); see Cody Montgomery, 
supra note 2 (showing acid mine drainage of a reclaimed surface mine and explaining the mountain 
top removal process).  In 2008, the Bush Administration replaced a rule allowing excess spoil and 
coal mine waste within the stream buffer zone, if it is not reasonably possible to avoid dumping 
into the valley.  Excess Soil, Coal Mine Waste, and Buffers for Perennial and Intermittent Streams, 
73 Fed. Reg. 75814, 75814 (Dec. 12, 2008); see also 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2016) (defining 
3
Moore: A Prayer for Strict Liability in Appalachia
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018
  
264 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 20:261 
daily with diesel fuel and ammonia nitrate.8  Then, the shale and 
sandstone are pushed into the valleys, ultimately transforming the rolling 
mountains of Appalachia into a barren plateau of abandoned strip mines.9  
The coal is mined with massive draglines and dump trucks.10  The natural 
hydrology of Appalachia is permanently destroyed by surface mining, 
which releases heavy metals and sediments from the exploded rock into 
the headwater streams.11  Under the authority of a United States Army 
Corps of Engineers permit, the intermittent headwater streams are 
minimally protected using underlain pipes.12  Near the end of these 
valley fills, sediment or settlement ponds are constructed in the path of 
the intermittent and now buried streams.13  Using the coal industry’s 
“best technology,” bulldozers construct a pond with an earthen dam.14  A 
 
acceptable fill materials under an Army Corps permit: “[e]xamples of such fill material include, 
but are not limited to . . . overburden from mining . . . .”). 
8. See e.g., Hunter Nichols, HUGE Mining Explosion Caught on Camera, YOUTUBE (Sept. 
25, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rKOxmXXpHj8 (showing strip mining explosion); 
gmc sierrahd, Strip Mining Keeps the Lights On, YOUTUBE, (July 16, 2013) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VmgyNzRSBn0 (beginning at six minutes).  Surface mining 
is permitted up to 300 feet to the nearest house.  See 30 C.F.R. § 761.11(e) (2016) (codifying areas 
where surface coal mining operations are prohibited or limited); see also id. § 761.15 (describing 
procedures for obtaining a waiver of prohibition on surface mining within the buffer zone of an 
occupied dwelling); Id. §§ 816.61–816.68 (2017) (describing procedures regulating the use of 
explosives in strip mining operations).  Regulations require extensive review of any proposed 
blasting intended to occur within 1,000 feet of a dwelling or other buildings.  Id. § 816.61(d).  
Residents within 1/2 mile of the permitted blasting area may request the blasting operator to survey 
the resident’s home to document pre-blast damage and other physical factors that may be affected 
by the blast.  Id. § 816.62(b)–(c) (2017). 
9. See Reilly, 728 F. Supp. at 1281 (explaining treatment ponds are “constructed by filling 
the stream . . . with earth and rock”); see also Rob Perks, Time to End Mountaintop Removal Coal 
Mining, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/ 
files/appalachian.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW86-3F39] (estimating nearly 2,000 miles of intermittent 
streams are buried or polluted by valley fills). 
10. John G. Mitchell, When Mountains Move, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. (Mar. 2006), 
http://science.nationalgeographic.com/science/earth/surface-of-the-earth/when-mountains-move. 
html 
11. Robert L. Hopkins II et al., Exploring the Legacy Effects of Surface Coal Mining on 
Stream Chemistry, 713 HYDROBIOLOGIA 87, 87 (2013).  
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2014). 
13. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. at 1281 (“The ponds at issue are located in existing streambeds 
downstream from the fills . . . .  The primary purpose of the pond is to allow sediments suspended 
in the runoff to ‘settle out’ of the water . . . .  It is undisputed that a NPDES permit is required for 
the discharges from the pond into the stream at the outlet.”). 
14. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(10)(B)(i) (2012) (“[C]onducting surface coal mining operations so 
as to prevent, to the extent possible using the best technology currently available, additional 
4
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metal culvert is placed a few feet below the top of the earthen dam.15  
Water from the valley’s intermittent stream collects below the mine in 
the sediment pond.16  Surface water from the sediment pond reenters the 
stream loaded with known pollutants.17   
The settlement pond is designed to temporarily hold the runoff from 
mine sites allowing the heavy metals to descend to the bottom of the 
pond.18  The water exiting the pond at the culvert, known as the discharge 
monitor point, becomes the first place regulators from state agencies 
charged with compliance under the Clean Water Act may monitor the 
quality of the water at surface mining sites.19  Any pollutants introduced 
into the stream from the mining site above the discharge monitor point 
may not be tested until the water exits the culvert.20 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act (SMCRA) were important steps in protecting the 
environment from coal-mining companies that externalize their costs by 
polluting surrounding communities.21  Unfortunately, in Appalachia, 
 
contributions of suspended solids to streamflow, or runoff outside the permit area, but in no event 
shall contributions be in excess of requirements set by applicable State or Federal law[.]”). 
15. Reilly, 728 F. Supp. at 1289. 
16. Id. 
17. See id. (“[B]ecause [the Clean Water Act] was not intended to license discharges to 
freely use waters of the United States as waste treatment systems, the definition makes clear that 
treatment systems created in those or from their impoundment remain waters of the United States.”) 
(citing 45 Fed. Reg 33,298 (May 19, 1980) (emphasis added)); Trey Moore (Treuwulf), Rick 
Handshoe: Settlement Ponds and Water, YOUTUBE (June 20, 2011), https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=gHIN3TvPrL8 [hereinafter Handshoe] (describing a sediment pond located 
on an active surface mine site and the consequences it has on the water). 
18. Handshoe, supra note 17 (describing the effects of liquid caustic soda being dumped 
into water sources). 
19. Kentuckians for the Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 448 (4th Cir. 2003); 
see State Compliance Monitoring Expectations, ECHO.EPA.GOV, https://echo.epa.gov/ 
trends/comparative-maps-dashboards/state-compliance-monitoring-expectations [https://perma.cc 
/CZR3-KN7P] (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) (discussing the national goals for compliance with 
standards set forth by the Environmental Protection Agency, including frequency of evaluations 
and measuring of compliance).  
20. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 214–16 (4th Cir. 
2009) (discussing the time frame in which regulatory authorities have the ability to monitor water 
quality and stream waters to fill ponds).  
21. See 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(22) (2012) (setting forth standards regarding placement of 
excess spoil material);  
Federal and state surface mining laws require that after an area has been mined, the disturbed area 
be ‘reclaimed’ and returned, to the extent possible to its original contour and condition. . . . Due to 
the ‘swell factor’ associated with earth removal, not all the earth and rock that was removed during 
5
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efforts to protect the environment have been framed as a “War on 
Coal,”22 while state regulators struggle to find the money and the 
willpower to properly regulate massive mining operations in their 
states.23  A long history of mining interests influence and dominate local 
government and the Eastern Kentucky economy.24  In the absence of 
federal or state enforcement, citizens often turn to common law claims of 
negligence and nuisance, permitted under SMCRA, to reclaim their land 
and make themselves whole again.25  Unfortunately, neither 
jurisdictional precedents nor the lax enforcement of federal 
environmental law sufficiently protect the people of Appalachia—they 
await the eventual harm that characterizes the historical relationship 
between surface mining and local communities.26 
Accumulating scientific and investigative research provides 
evidentiary proof of surface mining’s overbearing effect on 
Appalachia.27  Appalachian communities surrounding surface mining 
 
mining operations is needed to return the land to its original contour.  The excess earth and rock, or 
‘overburden’ or ‘spoil’ as it is sometimes called, must be disposed of in a manner consistent with 
federal and state law. 
Reilly, 728 F. Supp. at 1280–81.  
22. Compare Steve Cicala, Who’s Waging the War on Coal? Not the U.S. Government, 
FORBES (Oct. 27, 2016, 9:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ucenergy/2016/10/27/whos-
waging-the-war-on-coal-not-the-government/#1b7a27447543 (arguing that companies competing 
to provide cheaper electricity to customers, not the “War on Coal,” has harmed coal communities) 
with 100% FED Up, Lol! Obama’s Radical EPA Chief Says There Was No “War on Coal” . . . But 
Oops . . . That’s Not What The Poster Behind Her Says!, 100PERCENTFEDUP.COM (Feb. 9, 2017), 
http://100percentfedup.com/lol- obamas-radical-epa-chief-says-there-was-no-war-on-coalbut-
oopsthats-not-what-the-poster-behind-her-says (arguing the “War on Coal” exists in Washington, 
despite official statements). 
23. See Bill Estep, Report: Kentucky Inspecting Too Few Surface Mines, LEXINGTON 
HERALD LEADER (Nov. 29, 2012, 12:18 PM), http://www.kentucky.com/news/local/ 
article44391438.html [https://perma.cc/2PVF-YRE7] (noting the fact that less than 88% of 
inspections by surface-mining regulators were complete, combined with a 70% compliance rate in 
environmental standards, indicates an oversight in Kentucky). 
24. See generally Dean Hill Rivkin, Lawyering, Power, and Reform: The Legal Campaign 
to Abolish the Broad Form Mineral Deed, 66 TENN. L. REV. 467 (1999) (explaining the history and 
political struggle behind the broad form deed in Kentucky and its role in strip-mining damage). 
25.  See 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2012) (authorizing citizen suits for violations under the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act). 
26. See HARRY M. CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS: A BIOGRAPHY OF A 
DEPRESSED AREA 74 (1963) (discussing broad form deeds passed the right to “coal men” to divert 
and pollute the water and to cover the surface with toxic mining refuse) 
27. See Timothy L. Negley & Keith N. Eshleman, Comparison of Stormflow Responses of 
Surface-Mined and Forested Watersheds in the Appalachian Mountains, USA, 20 HYDROLOGICAL 
6
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operations suffer from lower property values and a need for diversified 
employment opportunities.28  While Appalachia provided America with 
“cheap” coal to fuel the economy,29 Appalachia in many ways has been 
forgotten and left to languish in poverty and unemployment.30 
This Comment presents scientific and economic evidence supporting a 
determination that surface mining in Appalachia is an abnormally 
dangerous activity.  The author questions precedential judicial 
interpretations of early state decisions that improperly balanced 
economic and community interests before and after the passing of the 
SMCRA and the Clean Water Act.31  If harmed by surface mining 
activities, a landowner may file negligence, nuisance, trespass, and any 
other common law claims under SMCRA.32  But, common law claims 
are limited by the reach of their remedies.33  Damages are generally 
limited to monetary compensation for past harms when the outcome is 
positive.34  Strict liability for surface mining in Appalachia would have 
 
PROCESSES 3467, 3467 (2006) (indicating surface mining and reclamation increases stormflow 
responses); Hopkins II et al., supra note 11, at 87 (exploring the long-term effects of surface coal 
mining on streams in the Raccoon Creek watershed in central Appalachia); Michael Hendryx & 
Melissa M. Ahern, Mortality in Appalachia Coal Mining Regions: The Value of Statistical Life 
Lost, 124 PUB. HEALTH REP. 541 (2009) (explaining “the human cost of the Appalachian coal 
mining economy outweighs its economic benefits.”). 
28. See Sheryl G. Stolberg, Beyond Coal: Imagining Appalachia’s Future, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/us/beyond-coal-imagining-appalachias-
future.html [https://nyti.ms/2jMCk3V] (encouraging individuals in Appalachia to set aside political 
and environmental feuds to create an entrepreneurial economy). 
29. See BARBARA FREESE, COAL: A HUMAN HISTORY 112–13 (2003) (describing 
Appalachia as the gateway to cheap coal in the east during the late 1700s). 
30. See Unemployment Rates in Appalachia, 2014, APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION 
(Aug. 2017), https://www.arc.gov/research/MapsofAppalachia.asp?MAP_ID=27 [https://perma. 
cc/FZ6E-NAQG] (indicating unemployment rates can reach up to fourteen percent in some portions 
of Appalachia); see Appalachian Poverty, FAHE, https://fahe.org/appalachian-poverty 
[https://perma.cc/BL9L-KZDJ] (comparing the average U.S. poverty rate in 2010–2014 as 15.6% 
to 19.7% in Appalachia). 
31. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012); 22 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). 
32. 30 U.S.C. § 1270(e) (2012). 
33. See Jason J. Czarnezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental 
Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2007) (suggesting the available common law 
claims and remedies available in environmental torts). 
34. See id at 30 (indicating traditional forms of monetary relief are common, but 
inadequate).  Pollution poses the significant problem of being a continual harm and in some cases 
an eternal harm.  See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (1970) (noting the current 
problem in effecting the control of air pollution).  Permanent injunctions for nuisance or negligence 
7
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a sweeping and positive impact on the vulnerable communities of 
Appalachia.35  Strict liability serves to hold the actor accountable and 
deter indifference and poor conduct, thereby placing the costs of liability 
on the risk-taker profiting from the enterprise rather than innocent 
neighbors.36  A finding of strict liability for the abnormally dangerous 
activity of surface mining in Appalachia would force the coal mining 
industry to come to terms with the real harms and costs it externalizes on 
state and local communities.37 
Part II of this Comment explores the history of Appalachia and 
identifies the forces contributing to the disparate wealth differences 
between absentee landowners and local residents.38  Part III describes 
federal laws promulgated to protect Appalachian communities and the 
legal struggles to determine which waters will be protected by federal 
law.39 Part IV evaluates the long-term consequences of surface mining 
in Appalachia.40  Part V discusses the evolving legal theory of strict 
liability for engaging in abnormally dangerous activities.41  Part VI 
applies the scientific and economic data from the last thirty years to 
analyze surface mining in Appalachia as an abnormally dangerous 
 
claims will doubtfully survive appellate review.  See generally id. at 871 (indicating temporary 
injunctions are a more appropriate remedy until compliance is met). 
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 519 (AM. LAW INST. 
1977) (stating strict liability will be imposed from harm caused by abnormally dangerous 
activities). 
36. See generally Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 
(7th Cir. 1990) (explaining strict liability will incentivize an actor to internalize a cost-benefit 
analysis); Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 31, 35 (1969) (holding that “blasting involves a 
substantial risk of harm no matter the degree of care exercised . . . ”). 
37. See e.g., Michael Hendryx, et al., Lung Cancer Mortality Is Elevated in Coal-Mining 
Areas of Appalachia, 62 LUNG CANCER 1, 5 (2007) [hereinafter Lung Cancer] (correlating the 
exposure to particulate matter and impurities from the coal-mining industry to higher lung cancer 
mortality in Appalachia). 
38. See e.g., BARBARA RASMUSSEN, ABSENTEE LANDOWNING AND EXPLOITATION IN 
WEST VIRGINIA, 1760-1920, at 2 (contending Virginia’s political system made absentee farmers 
vulnerable to the desires of industrialists).  
39. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012); 22 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). 
40. See e.g., MELISSA FRY KONTY & JASON BAILEY, MOUNTAIN ASS’N FOR CMTY. ECON. 
DEV., THE IMPACT OF COAL ON THE KENTUCKY STATE BUDGET 9 (2009) (estimating a cost of 
$238.9 million dollars for the 2006 fiscal year to Kentucky for maintaining the coal haul road 
system as another example of externalized costs of the coal mining industry). 
41. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520(a) & (b) (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (setting 
forth the elements for a finding of strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity). 
8
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activity under the Third Restatement § 20.42  Part VII sets forth a 
jurisprudential theory supporting a change in jurisdictional views on 
surface mining in light of relevant scientific and economic evidence.  
II.    HISTORY: SHIFTING ECONOMIES AND ABSENTEE OWNERS 
The Appalachian Mountains were untamed until the mid-1700s as 
early American colonists began inhabiting more remote areas.43  The 
self-reliant people who populated Central Appalachia were dependent on 
community relationships, subsistence farming, and hunting.44  As more 
settlers moved west, surveyors, speculators, geologists, and mapmakers 
appraised the giant seams of soft coal exposed by local rivers.45  
Speculators representing industrial interests moved quickly to purchase 
vast tracks of Appalachia, including Eastern Kentucky and West 
Virginia.46  If speculators could not buy the land outright, they purchased 
the timber or mineral rights for minimal costs from landowners that did 
not realize the value beneath their feet.47   
While industrialists recognized the profitability of natural resources, 
Appalachia’s geographic isolation and mountains presented formidable 
 
42. See e.g., Michael Hendryx, Mortality from Heart, Respiratory, and Kidney Disease in 
Coal Mining Areas of Appalachia, 82 INT’L ARCHIVES OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 243, 
243 (2008) [hereinafter Mortality] (correlating the rate of disease and mortality in coal-mining areas 
with that of environmental exposure to toxic agents in coal); see also Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 
27, at 547 (identifying higher mortality rates in areas with higher mining). 
43. See ROBERT SHOGAN, THE BATTLE OF BLAIR MOUNTAIN: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S 
LARGEST LABOR UPRISING 10 (2004) (describing the “sparsely populated” land inhabited by self-
reliant farmers and hunters “set in their ways”); see also CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 5–7 (explaining 
many of the early inhabitants were indentured servants, orphans, debtors, and criminals brought 
from Great Britain who had escaped from the plantation system of the early colonies). 
44. See CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 8–10 (describing the mountaineer subsistence lifestyle 
of the 1830s, characterized by a rugged struggle for survival, lack of literacy, and basic education). 
45. See JOSEPH T. LAMBIE, FROM MINE TO MARKET: THE HISTORY OF COAL 
TRANSPORTATION ON THE NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY 26–27 (Ralph W. Hidy ed., 1954) 
(highlighting a number of geological surveys from 1839 to 1842 describing central Appalachia as 
a vast region of exploitable coal); FREESE, supra note 29, at 106 (describing the findings of coal by 
mapmakers and geologists in the Ohio River region). 
46. CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 61 (explaining speculators from northern and eastern cities 
recognized the potential of the vast virgin forests as they purchased timber in the 1880s, but soon 
recognized the wealth of the bituminous coal underneath the land). 
47. See RASMUSSEN, supra note 38, at 2 (stating early exploitation of mineral rights by out-
of-state industrialists would have a lasting effect on the government, economy, and social welfare 
of West Virginia.) 
9
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obstacles to seizing the wealth of the region.48  After the Civil War, 
railroads transported Appalachia’s bituminous coal to manufacturing 
cities in the East.49  As railroads and timber speculators ventured into 
Appalachia, they eventually discovered many Appalachians claimed land 
to which they had no legal title.50  Eastern industrialists sent teams of 
surveyors and lawyers to survey the land and examine land titles that were 
not patented and proceeded to formally apply for patents through the 
state.51  Local inhabitants were denied their land ownership claims52 as 
absentee landowners secured vast land grants for nominal fees.53  
Mirroring the Industrial Revolution in Britain fifty years before,54 
American industrialization depended on coal to power the machines 
forming the backbone of its economy.55  Railroad companies brought 
 
48. See SHOGAN, supra note 43, at 1 (describing the construction of bridges and carving of 
tunnels through the Appalachian foothills in order to transport coal); cf. LAMBIE, supra note 45, at 
28 (describing Norfolk’s emergence and immediate decision to reach the mineral deposits of the 
Flat Top Region as threefold: (1) to supply fuel to the iron industry in Virginia; (2) to lower the 
cost of fuel for their own railroad, reducing operating costs; and (3) to supply the eastern markets 
for industrial and home use). 
49. FREESE, supra note 29, at 112.  Bituminous coal is highly volatile and higher in quality 
than lignite coal.  Id.  Bituminous coal was a valuable resource for the industrializing nation.  See 
id. at 127 (stating railroads had fifty years of experience of supplying coal to urban markets and 
became monopolies that established their power by price fixing, cutting labor wages, and busting 
unions); see also SHOGAN, supra note 43, at 1 (stating Norfolk and Western railroad lines brought 
workers who constructed sixty bridges and eight tunnels to transport coal from its point of 
extraction). 
50. CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 65 (stating agents examining land titles discovered locals 
either held no legal title or had tenuous claims at best). 
51. See id. (describing “wildcat surveys” that allowed companies to apply for immense areas 
of unpatented land, including farm lands covered by prior patents).  
52. Id. (stating “‛junior’ patents were void as to the lands within their compass which had 
been previously granted by the state, but subsequently the courts held them to be valid as to all 
intervening lands the mountaineers had neglected to appropriate.”)  Locals were often unable to 
mount the legal defense necessary to defend their lands against the imported and able attorneys 
serving eastern industrial interests. Id. 
53. See id. at 71 (stating huge tracts of unclaimed land were “dirt cheap” and selling for “no 
more than 26 1/2 cents per acre.”). 
54. See FREESE, supra note 29, at 71–99 (describing the process by which coal inevitably 
fueled England’s industrialization). 
55. Anthony Trollope spoke of the industrial city of Pittsburgh:  
Even the filth and wondrous blackness of the place are picturesque when looked down upon from 
above.  The tops of the churches are visible and some of the larger buildings may be partially traced 
through the thick brown settled smoke.  But the city itself is buried in a dense cloud.  I was never 
10
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thousands of European immigrants to Appalachia to mine coal.56  As the 
Industrial Revolution thirsted for natural resources, Appalachia was 
stripped of timber, then its coal was extracted.57 
Foreseeing that the railroads were decades away from reaching more 
remote parts of Appalachia, speculators concentrated on acquiring only 
the mineral rights of inhabited lands.58  Many of the mineral rights in 
Kentucky were secured under an instrument known as the “broad form” 
deed which conveyed the mineral rights with contractual privileges and 
immunities, including a waiver of liability for mining coal by any means 
the grantee chose.59  By the 1900s, most of Appalachia’s mineral rights 
were owned by Eastern holding companies.60  By 1924, Fordson Coal 
Company, a subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company, owned half of the 
land in Leslie County, Kentucky.61  In 1974, an investigation into the 
legal titles of non-public land in West Virginia showed twenty-four out-
of-state corporations owned one-third of privately owned lands.62  
Consolidation Coal Co., a wholly owned subsidiary of Conoco, was the 
 
more in love with smoke and dirt than when I stood here and watched the darkness of night close in 
upon the floating soot which hovered over the house-tops of the city. 
Id. 
56. See id. at 139–40 (stating labor agents lured Slavs, Hungarians, and Italians directly 
from Europe to work in the mines).  Generally, immigrants were housed in company-owned mining 
camps, worked for script instead of money, and lacked the ability and language skills to negotiate 
their wages or working conditions. Id. 
57. See CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 71, 83 (describing how the Industrial Revolution and the 
expansion of the railroad drove people to mineral rich areas resulting in land exploitation). 
58. See id. at 71–72 (explaining how speculators initially bought large amounts of land, but 
acquired only the mineral rights to appurtenant lands—which were more profitable—due to the 
slow evolution of the railroad). 
59. See id at 74 (describing the utilization and advantages of the broad-form deed). 
60. Robert Shogan’s description of Eastern rail road company’s land acquisition practices 
is illustrative:  
[T]he well-tailored, smooth-talking agents of the Norfolk and Western had descended on southern 
West Virginia like locusts, their checking accounts fattened by funds from Philadelphia and across 
the sea in the City of London, and systematically bought up all the land they could lay their hands 
on. And not just the land. They were careful to secure the mineral rights, too. 
SHOGAN, supra note 43, at 1. 
61. CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 65. 
62. See Tom D. Miller, Absentees Dominate Land Ownership, THE HERALD-ADVERTISER 
& THE HERALD-DISPATCH, reprinted in WHO OWNS WEST VIRGINIA?, supra note 5, at 2 
(comparing the total amount of land in West Virginia to that owned by private corporations and 
companies using the land for its minerals). 
11
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largest single landholder in West Virginia.63  Coal companies and 
railroads exerted considerable power over state legislatures and local 
economies.64  This influence was exemplified by company-owned towns 
lacking municipal governments;65 lower tax assessments for large land 
and leaseholders;66 and state funded infrastructure projects that 
supported mining interests.67   
The historical record reveals coal companies and absentee landholders 
employed highly skilled lawyers to challenge titles already in possession 
of local citizens.68  In general, the mineral rights were procured at a 
fraction of their value.69  The agents often purchased mineral and timber 
rights from an illiterate and unsophisticated population unlikely to 
imagine the possibility that their lands might become ripe for mining 
anything of value.70  The consequences of the unilateral relationship 
 
63. Id. 
64. See Harry L. Baisden, Coal, Timber, Gas Attract Absentee Landlords, THE HERALD-
ADVERTISER & THE HERALD-DISPATCH, reprinted in WHO OWNS WEST VIRGINIA?, supra note 5, 
at 8–9, 13–14, 18 (discussing the significant impact energy industries acquired to influence 
government and the economy in Appalachia as the town was built and owned by Island Creek Coal 
Co.); SHOGAN, supra note 43, at 37 (unfolding the immense economic influence of coal 
companies). 
65. See Harry L. Baisden, Coal, Timber, Gas Attract Absentee Landlords, THE HERALD-
ADVERTISER & THE HERALD-DISPATCH, reprinted in WHO OWNS WEST VIRGINIA?, supra note 5, 
at 13–14 (stating Holden, West Virginia was built and owned by Island Creek Coal Co., which paid 
for the town’s public services).  “A retired . . . schoolteacher [suggested] . . . ‘You see the homes 
and stores in the valleys but you just don’t think who owns all that property up on the hillsides.’”  
Id. at 13–14. 
66. Tom D. Miller, Route 99 Classic Example of Coal Firms’ Influence, THE HERALD-
ADVERTISER & THE HERALD-DISPATCH, reprinted in WHO OWNS WEST VIRGINIA?, supra note 5, 
at 23 (“A study four years ago concluded assessments on coal lands should be four times the level 
on the 1970 tax books.”).  Tax payers were subsidizing the loss in revenue from lands owned by 
absentee holding companies at the cost of underfunding the state’s public school system.  Id. 
67. See id. at 22–25 (explaining the legislative history of Route 99 that was built under the 
influence of mining interests).  The road was built to withstand the heavy traffic of semi-trailers 
carrying equipment to strip mine sites that were previously inaccessible.  Id. at 22–25. 
68. See CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 61–62 (claiming companies retained lawyers “to scout 
the region and appraise the condition of land titles”). 
69. Id. at 75. 
70.  
Most of them ‘touched the pen and made their mark,’ in the form of a spidery X, in the presence of 
a witness whom the agent had thoughtfully brought along . . . .  Unable to read the instrument or 
able to read it only with much uncertainty, the sellers relied upon the agent for an explanation of its 
contents–contents which were to prove deadly to the welfare of generations of the mountaineer’s 
descendants. 
12
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between absentee landholder and local citizen play out in the 
communities of Appalachia, as landowners are forced to the courts and 
legislatures as the only means of reprieve, remedy, and justice.71  
III.    MINING INTERESTS INFLUENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES 
AND THE COURTS 
The broad form mineral deed drafted by coal and land companies in 
the late 1800s and early 1900s severed mineral rights from corresponding 
surface rights.72  The deed conferred on the grantee the use of the surface 
estate for “any means and by any way necessary or convenient” in the 
recovery of the minerals.73  As early as 1892, Kentucky recognized the 
disparity in bargaining power between the landholder and the 
sophisticated mining interest.74   
When the coal mining industry mechanized fifty years later, surface 
mining developed as a highly efficient—although powerfully 
destructive—form of coal mining.75  As the consequences of surface 
mining became irredeemably obvious, surface landowners charged 
 
See id. at 74  
71. See id. at 305 (describing how even when individuals went to seek legal remedy, courts 
upheld and enlarged the ancient deeds). 
72. Rivkin, supra note 24, at 479. 
73. See id. (emphasizing the complexity and length of the deed signed by indigenous 
landholders). It is worth noting these early deeds did not contain the right to strip mine; the method 
had not been developed at the time these deeds were used.  Id.  
74. See, e.g., Wollums v. Horsely, 20 S.W. 781, 782 (Ky. 1892)  
[The land in question] is proven to have been worth[,] in April, 1889, $15 an acre, and that this value 
arises almost altogether from its mineral worth; and yet the appellee is asking the enforcement of a 
contract by means of which he seeks to obtain all the oil, gas, and minerals, and the virtual control 
of the land, at 40 cents an acre. . . .  Equity should not help such a harsh bargain. . . .  His agent, 
when the trade was made, assured the appellant that he would never be bothered by the contract 
during his lifetime.  He was lulled in the belief that the Rip Van Winkle sleep of that locality in 
former days was to continue, and the grossly inadequate price of this purchase can only be accounted 
for upon the ground that the appellant was misled and acted under gross misapprehension. The 
contract was not equitable or reasonable, or grounded upon sufficient consideration, and no interest 
has arisen in any third party. A court of equity should therefore refuse its specific enforcement. 
75. See Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., Inc., 422 U.S. 1012, 1013–14 (1975) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting from denial of cert.) (explaining that seventy years prior, mineral rights had been deeded 
away).  “This case is unfortunately no more than a mere footnote in a continuing tragedy of 
environmental and human despoliation.  The rape of Appalachia for its precious coal has been a 
dark and dismal chapter in our Nation’s history[.]”  Id. at 1013 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial 
of cert.). 
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mining companies with nuisance, trespass, and breach of contract.76  
Surface owners in Appalachia were rebuffed in most of their legal 
endeavors for relief.77  Many suits were foreclosed by the decision in 
Buchanan v. Watson which resoundingly validated the broad form 
deed.78  In Buchanan, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that although 
the parties did not expressly contemplate surface mining during the 
formation of the deed, to deny the right to remove the coal by the only 
feasible process was to defeat the purpose of the deed.79  The court 
engaged in traditional contract interpretation allowing the broad form 
deed to encompass unbargained-for rights80 in an effort to protect 
business interests that relied on the broad form deed to pursue mineral 
rights.81  The hardship for a more equitable interpretation of the deed was 
characterized as an industry hardship rather than the landowner’s right to 
protect the surface from total destruction.82  As a result, Buchanan’s 
interpretation of the broad form deed was insulated within the hallowed 
authority of stare decisis.83   
At the heart of the broad form deed controversy was whether surface 
landowners could legally refuse consent to surface mine for coal  
on their property.84  A full legal assault, backed by overwhelming public  
  
 
76. See Rivkin, supra note 24, at 482 (bemoaning that landowners must “resort[] to the 
courts” due to conflicts between surface and mineral owners). 
77. Id. at 481–85. 
78. 290 S.W.2d 40, 43–44 (Ky. 1956) (holding “law of property rights should remain 
stable,” as disturbing the long-standing rule would cause confusion). 
79. Id. at 42. 
80. See id. at 43 (applying “fundamental rules of constructions of deeds” in the absence of 
ambiguity).  The court recognized the parties’ reliance on traditional and precedential rules of 
contract interpretation when forming their contractual rights and obligations.  Id. 
81. See id. at 43–44 (concluding “[t]he doctrine of stare decisis requires that we do not 
depart from the established rule”). 
82. Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., Inc., 422 U.S. 1012, 1015, 1017–18 (1975) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting from denial of cert.) (“With the advance of technology, however, the stakes increased; 
each successive innovation was visited upon the mountaineers with the approval of the courts, 
which found these new and unforeseen techniques to fall within the scope of the aged and yellowing 
deeds. . . .”). 
83. See Buchanan, 290 S.W.2d at 44 (validating established rule as precedent that must not 
be altered). 
84. See Rivkin, supra note 24, at 483 (identifying surface landowner defiance through 
protests, closures of property entrances, and borderline warfare). 
14
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sentiment, was raised against the broad form deed that included 
challenges under contractual theories, interpretation of adhesion 
contracts, and estoppel.85  The court of last resort in Kentucky rejected 
every argument.86  Undeterred by fifty years of judicial indifference, 
Appalachian landowners attempted to set forth policy changes in 
legislation that would protect the surface rights of landowners.  Their 
efforts resulted in the passage of a bill in 1974 that required written 
consent by a landowner prior to the issuance of a surface mining 
permit.87  The statute was later struck down as unconstitutional for its 
perceived lack of a public purpose.88  Although public outrage 
concerning the coal mining industry remained constant from the 1940s to 
1988, Kentucky citizens were left defenseless against the very economic, 
legal, and political bodies meant to protect them.89  In 1988, after more 
than forty years of surface mining, Kentucky’s Constitution was amended 
to include a limited and statutorily required interpretation of the broad 
form deed that, in the absence of express terms describing the method of 
extraction, limited extraction to the “methods of commercial coal 
extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky in the area affected 
at the time the instrument was executed.”90  Kentuckians fought for over 





86. Id. at 484; see Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Ky. 1968), 
overruled by Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987) (holding all six issues landowners 
argued do not have “the overwhelming force” necessary to prevail over the established rule). 
87. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350.060(8) (1974), invalidated by Dep’t for Nat. Res. & Envtl. 
Protection v. No. 8 Ltd. of Va., 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1975); Rivkin, supra note 24, at 486–87. 
88. Dep’t for Nat. Res. & Envtl. Protection v. No. 8 Ltd. of Va., 528 S.W.2d 684, 686–87 
(1975) (finding the statutory grant of a consent requirement by a surface owner bears no real or 
substantial relationship to the public’s general welfare). The court indicated that in the absence of 
a public purpose, police powers were not justified.  Id. at 686; see Rivkin, supra note 24, at 488 
(indicating the overwhelming support in passing the bill was a false flag; behind the legislative 
scene the coal industry was already mounting a formidable challenge). 
89. See Rivkin, supra note 24, at 478 (stating unity of the legal system was significantly 
influenced by mining interests present in the legislative and judicial bodies, which perpetuated the 
inequalities characterized by heavy mining communities). 
90. KY. CONST. § 19(2) (amended 1988). 
15
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IV.    FEDERAL LEGISLATION’S ATTEMPT TO MITIGATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL INJURIES IN APPALACHIA 
A. The Intention and Purpose of SMCRA 
Concurrent with the struggle against the broad form deed in Kentucky, 
the federal government introduced legislation that emphasized an 
important policy shift in America toward protecting the environment 
against business interests that externalized environmental costs on local 
communities and state governments.91  SMCRA was passed in 1977 to 
regulate the environmental impacts of surface mining coal and other 
natural resources.92  Congress found coal extraction “essential to the 
national interest to insure the existence of an expanding and economically 
healthy underground coal mining industry.”93  Congress also found that 
surface mining results in consequences adverse to commerce, as well as 
the public.94  It destroys “the utility of the land for commercial, 
industrial, residential, recreational, agricultural, and forestry purpose[s],” 
and contributes to floods, pollutes water, causes landslides, destroys 
natural habitats, damages the property of citizens, “degrad[es] the quality 
of life in local communities,” and counteracts government programs to 
conserve and protect environmental interests.95  Congress intended 
SMCRA to set forth federal guidelines that would monitor the permitting 
and reclamation of surface mine sites through federally approved state 
administration.96  Interestingly, SMCRA section 1201(j) expressly 
recognizes a national interest in surface mining coal under the Commerce 
 
91. Brian Peterson, Note, Confusion in Regulating Coal Mine Water Pollution: Regulatory 
Overlap in SMCRA and the CWA, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 595, 597 (1997) (stating the Carter 
administration passed SMCRA to regulate environmental impacts of surface mining, including the 
externalizing of environmental costs on local communities and state governments). 
92. Id. 
93. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2012) (noting 
Congressional findings expressly state that “coal mining operations presently contribute 
significantly to the Nation’s energy requirements”) (emphasis added). “Presently” may be up for 
judicial interpretation in the contemporary energy consumption context.  Further, a formidable 
argument could be made that surface mining undermines the ability of conventional underground 
mining to compete with surface mining’s artificially deflated price in the market. 
94. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2012); see 30 C.F.R. § 761.11(b) (2016) (requiring land under 
federal protection may not be surface mined without existing rights or meeting certain findings). 
95. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2012); see 30 C.F.R. § 761.11(b) (2016) (discussing the destructive 
consequences extracting coal has on geographically vulnerable areas). 
96. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f), (g), (k) (2012); Id. § 1211(c) (9) & (10). 
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Clause, but simultaneously expresses this interest should be managed in 
“an environmentally sound manner[.]”97  Overall, Congress found 
SMCRA’s intentions necessitate state and federal cooperation to “prevent 
and mitigate” destructive environmental practices.98  
While SMCRA recognizes the necessity of surface coal mining to the 
nation’s energy requirements and economic self-sufficiency, these 
compelling interests are to be balanced with environmental and 
agricultural productivity.99  Balancing the competing interests assures 
the rights of surface landowners and those with interests in land are “fully 
protected from such [surface mining].”100  Other legislative purposes 
include protecting the environment,101 prohibiting surface mining where 
reclamation is unfeasible,102 as well as promoting the reclamation of 
abandoned mine sites prior to the enactment of SMCRA.103  After the 
state establishes regulatory programs no less stringent than SMCRA 
requirements,104 the state retains “exclusive jurisdiction” over the 
enforcement of state regulations, subject to federal oversight.105   
SMCRA intended to curb environmental and community degradation 
in Appalachia through formalizing a permitting process requiring mining 
companies to assure state and federal governments that they would 
minimize damage to the surface and reclaim the land for agricultural and 
 
97. Id. § 1201(j). 
98. Id. § 1201(k).  But see Telephone Interview with Mary V. Cromer, Staff Attorney, 
Appalachian Citizens’ Law Ctr. (Oct. 8, 2016) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review 
on Race and Social Justice) (stating that in practice, Kentucky’s mining and clean water agencies 
feel free of the burden of federal oversight, are generally underfunded, and have enacted laws that 
are no more stringent than SMCRA requires). 
99. See 30 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (2012) (stating expressly the nation’s economic and social well-
being “strike a balance” with environmental and agricultural concerns). 
100. Id. § 1202(b). 
101. Id.  
102. Id. § 1202(d). This particular purpose of the act could mean surface mining is not 
feasible in Appalachia if companies cannot find a way to conduct surface mining without harming 
the community and the environment.  See id. § 1202(c) (explaining that if the Secretary disapproves 
of a proposed State program, he may reject it and await the resubmission of a revised State 
program). 
103. Id. § 1202(h). 
104. Id. § 1253(a)(2). 
105. Id.  The Secretary of the Interior retains a right of reentry under any properly permitted 
surface mining site.  Id. § 1253(a).  The conditions are delineated in §§ 1271 & 1273. Id. 
17
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environmental productivity.106  Permit applications require a 
reclamation plan.107  Reclamation plans must contain an “assessment of 
the probable cumulative impact of all anticipated mining in the area on 
the hydrologic balance specified,”108 inside and outside of the permitted 
area.109  The assessment should be comprehensive and cumulative; 
intend to preserve the hydrologic balance; anticipate and minimize water 
pollution; and avoid producing acid mine drainage.110  The permitting 
process requires mining companies post a performance bond covering the 
area of land on which the permittee will conduct surface coal mining and 
reclamation.111  The amount of the bond must be “sufficient to assure the 
completion of the reclamation plan” by the state agency in the event of 
forfeiture.112 
The state has jurisdiction over a permittee’s compliance with the 
permit,113  while the Secretary of Interior retains final authority to 
inspect surface mining sites.114  SMCRA mandates permittees monitor 
and record the groundwater, surface drainage, rainfall, and well logs at 
surface mine sites.115  In other words, the permittee, a coal mining 
 
106. See id. § 1256 (stating “no person shall engage in . . . coal mining operations unless” 
they have obtained a permit); Id. § 1258 (requiring mining companies to submit a detailed 
description of the measures they would take to mitigate environmental injuries). 
107. Id. § 1257(d). 
108. Id. § 1260(b)(3).  The environmental survey and report are fundamental to the proper 
implementation of best practices to curb environmental and community degradation. See id. § 
1260(a) (indicating the regulatory authority can mandate compliance with reclamation plans). 
109. See id. § 1257(a)(11) (stating “the permit shall not be approved until such information 
is available and is incorporated into the application”); see also Interview with Mary V. Cromer, 
supra note 98 (opining no permit should be issued that would allow “material damage” to the water 
outside the permitted area). 
110. See id. § 1265(b)(10)(A) (minimizing disturbance during and after surface mining 
operation by “(i) preventing or removing water from contact with toxic producing deposits; and (ii) 
treating drainage to reduce toxic content which adversely affects downstream water upon being 
released to water courses”). 
111. Id. § 1259(a).  The performance bond shall cover the permitted area and will be 
sufficient to reclaim the land in the event of forfeiture.  Id. § 1259. 
112. Id. § 1259(a). 
113. Id. § 1253(b). 
114. Id. § 1267. 
115. Id. § 1267(b)(2); see Interview with Mary V. Cromer, supra note 98 (stating that if 
damage to the water is discovered while the site is being mined, then the site should be re-permitted 
and protective measures initiated to maintain water quality standards). 
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company, is charged with its own regulation.116  Records and reports of 
state inspections are available to the public at “sufficient locations . . . so 
that they are conveniently available to residents in the areas of 
mining.”117  As provided for by SMCRA, mining companies may 
construct sediment ponds using the “best technology currently available” 
to prevent runoff outside the permit area.118  While sediment ponds are 
a preventative measure, “in no event shall contributions” to the streams 
“be in excess of requirements set by applicable [s]tate or [f]ederal 
law[.]”119  SMCRA approves of sediment ponds to treat polluted waters; 
however, coal operators must comply with regulations set forth by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).120 
SMCRA contains a citizen suit provision, but state and federal 
agencies are given the first opportunity to correct the problem.121  The 
Secretary of Interior may request the Attorney General initiate a civil 
action for any violation of SMCRA’s environmental standards.122  If the 
penalty does not lead to a cessation order,123 the penalty shall not exceed 
$5,000 for each violation.124  Each day of a continuing violation may be 
construed as a separate violation.125  In the event that federal regulators 
do not act, a civil action to compel SMCRA compliance may be brought 
by citizens who are, or may be, adversely affected by surface coal 
mining.126  However, no action may commence if the Secretary is 
already prosecuting a civil action in a federal or state court, or if an action 
is brought “prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice in 
 
116. Id. § 1267(b)(1).  While the practicality of the coal industry maintaining its own 
records seems understandable and desirable, it stretches the imagination that an industry that has 
challenged every effort to regulate safety and environmental concerns would be a willing and 
trusted partner in environmental stewardship. 
117. Id. § 1267(f). 
118. Id. § 1265(b)(10)(B)(i). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. § 1265(b)(10)(C); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 434.10, 434.11(o) (2016) (stating “treatment 
system” applies to any structure that treats coal mine drainage, coal preparation waste water, or 
drainage from coal preparation plant). 
121. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1270–1271 (2012). 
122. Id. § 1271(c). 
123. See id. § 1271(a) (requiring the Secretary, or authorized representative, to order 
cessation of surface coal mining operations related to violation until such violation is abated). 
124. Id. § 1268(a). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. § 1270(a). 
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writing of the violation.”127  SMCRA expressly protects a citizen’s rights 
to pursue relief under the common law, after state and federal agencies 
fail to act.128 
If a coal operator successfully completes the reclamation plan as set 
out in the permit, and the bond is discharged, then the coal operator is 
released of all liability under SMCRA.129  Any subsequent harm from 
latent problems falls to the state or local community to repair.130  
However, if pollution is discovered, the abandoned mine may fall under 
the authority of the Abandoned Mine Land provision of SMCRA.131   
B. The Clean Water Act and “[W]aters of the United States”  
The Clean Water Act (CWA) regulates the type and amount of 
pollutants allowed to enter all “waters of the United States.”132  Five 
years before SMCRA was drafted, Congress passed the Clean Water Act 
to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical[,] and biological integrity 
of the Nation’s waters.”133  Initially, the CWA set goals to eliminate the 
discharge of pollutants by 1985.134  When the CWA was passed, 
industrialists were concerned about whether waste treatment ponds 
would be considered “navigable waters of the United States,” and thereby 
fall under CWA’s authority to regulate pollutants.135  Since the Clean 
 
127. Id. § 1270(b)(1). 
128. Id. § 1270(e). 
129. Id. § 1269. 
130. See id. § 1269(a) (highlighting coal extractors seem to escape liability for the harm of 
extraction after applying for release of performance bond or deposits, yet landholders are liable for 
the long-term consequences of surface mining); see also Peterson, supra note 91, at 615 (stating 
that while SMCRA prohibits landholder liability for reclamation, they may be held liable under 
CWA).  
131. 30 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012); see Peterson, supra note 91, at 600–01 (stating the fund is 
unable to meet the needs of mined lands abandoned or reclaimed before 1977).  Pollution from 
abandoned mines through forfeiture or improper state oversight poses serious environmental and 
economic harm.  Id. at 596 
132. 40 C.F.R. § 122.1(b)(1) (2016). 
133. 22 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). 
134. Id. § 1251(a)(1). 
135. See Scott Snyder, Comment, The Waste Treatment Exclusion and Dubious Legal 
Foundation for the EPA’s Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 504, 
509–10 (2014) (stating the EPA intended to revise and develop the definition of “waste treatment 
systems,” later pointing out the EPA never actually did); see also Consolidated Permit Regulations, 
45 Fed. Reg. 141, 148 (July 21, 1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122) (identifying industry 
petitioners objecting to the new definition of “waters of the United States”).   
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Water Act only governs discharges into “navigable waters” of the United 
States, if a stream is found to be a water of the United States, then 
discharges from waste treatment ponds, including sediment ponds, fall 
under CWA purview.136  Yielding to industry pressure, the EPA 
postponed its regulation of waste treatment systems allowing the coal 
industry to continue utilizing natural bodies of water as treatment 
ponds.137  The EPA’s suspension of deciding whether or not waste 
treatment systems were “waters of the United States” during the notice 
and comment period essentially became a de facto rule.138  Some 
scholars question whether the waste treatment exclusion is legally 
permissible.139  Nevertheless, the EPA excludes waste treatment systems 
from the definition of “waters of the United States,” despite the fact that 
waste treatment systems are constructed in the path of intermittent 
springs—a standard practice of surface mining.140 
C. Case History of the Waste Treatment Exclusion in Appalachia 
(Army Corps of Engineers vs. EPA) 
Since the passage of SMCRA and CWA, environmental and business 
interest groups have repeatedly litigated whether waters above settlement 
ponds are waters of the United States, producing plurality opinions and 
strong dissents.141  The central issue, as expressed in West Virginia Coal 
Association v. Reilly, is whether the EPA was granted the authority to 
adopt regulations prohibiting in-stream treatment ponds.142  A permit 
 
136. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 80 Fed. Reg. 124, 
37099 (June 29, 2015). 
137. Snyder, supra note 135, at 514. 
138. See id. at 515–16 (indicating current treatment of “waters of the United States” 
definition as though the suspended provision is deleted, even though it is still present). 
139. See id. at 515–16, 529, 532 (stating it is doubtful whether the waste treatment exclusion 
would survive a Chevron test).  
140. See 40 C.F.R. §122.2 (2016) (stating “[w]aste treatment systems, including treatment 
ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act,” specifically manmade 
waters not originally created in the waters of the United States, are not considered “waters of the 
United States”); see also Snyder, supra note 135, at 520 (“[r]ather, at issue is the more discrete 
question of whether the definition permits the EPA to remove waters from ‘waters of the United 
States’ by regulation”). 
141. E.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 217 (4th Cir. 
2009) (Michael, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, 
Inc. v. Rivenbugh, 317 F.3d 425, 448 (4th Cir. 2003) (Luttig, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
142. 728 F. Supp. 1276, 1277 (S.D. W.Va. 1989). 
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under section 402 of the CWA (402 permit)143 allows the discharge of 
pollutants subject to the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) guidelines for monitoring and evaluating regulated 
pollutants discharged into the waters of the United States.144  While the 
EPA retains oversight, states are the primary regulators and issuers of 
permits for surface coal-mining operations.145  However, the EPA may 
object and withdraw approval of the state permitting scheme after finding 
the state scheme is not in compliance with the NPDES guidelines.146  
Adding to the confusion, a permit under section 404 of the CWA (404 
permit)147 gives the Army Corps of Engineers discretion to issue permits 
for “the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at 
specified disposal sites.”148  In Appalachia, 404 permits allow mining 
companies to dispose of the overlaying rock strata into the valleys 
surrounding surface mine sites.149  This process buries intermittent and 
perennial streams while sediment ponds are constructed to control run-
off from the mine site.150   
Reilly delineates the shifting and overlapping perspectives and 
jurisdictions of the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers concerning in-
stream treatment ponds of coal mining waste waters.151  Plaintiffs took 
exception that the EPA objected to sediment pond construction 1,000 feet 
 
143. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2014). 
144. Id.; see Reilly, 728 F. Supp. at 1278 (conditioning the issuance of permits for strip 
mining upon compliance of permittees with the requirements of the permit as set out by a scientific 
evaluation of the permitted area). 
145. 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (2012). 
146. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (2014). 
147. Id. § 1344. 
148. See Reilly, 728 F. Supp. at 1278–79 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988)) (stating 
“discharge of dredged or fill material . . . [is] expressly excepted from” EPA’s authority at specified 
disposal sites). 
149. See id. at 1281 (describing the methods in which valley fills are constructed and 
utilized); see also Perks, supra note 9, at 3 (explaining ramifications of overutilization of valley 
fills). 
150. See Reilly, 728 F. Supp. at 1293 (concluding no procedures for the construction and 
operation of fills and ponds in compliance with SMCRA and CWA had been established). 
However, the court did not find the EPA exceeded its authority in objecting to the 404 permitting 
process.  Id. 
151. See id. at 1287 n.6 (describing the Memorandum of Agreement entered into in 1986 
requiring fill material to include discharges of pollutants, but not for the primary purpose of 
disposing of waste to be regulated under the 402 permit) (emphasis added). 
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below one of the valley fills.152  Plaintiffs argued that discharges above 
the outfall points constituted discharges of fill material, which was 
beyond the control of a 402 permit and instead under control of the Army 
Corps of Engineers’ 404 permit.153  The court reframed the issue more 
narrowly, considering whether the EPA has statutory authority over fills 
and ponds, and whether the Army ceded control of fill material for 
purposes other than construction of in-stream waste systems.154  The 
EPA contended that in-stream treatment ponds, and the waters above 
such ponds, are “waters of the United States,” because they are an 
“impoundment of waters otherwise defined as waters of [the] United 
States.”155  The court deferred to the EPA’s interpretation of its own 
regulations156 and held that the EPA was vested with authority under the 
CWA to regulate fills and ponds.157  However, the court did not address 
the EPA’s authority to regulate fills and ponds through the internal waste 
stream rule, nor their veto power over 404 permits under the control of 
the Army Corps of Engineers.158   
In 2009, the issue of whether the EPA could require environmental 
impact studies on valley fills was addressed by the Fourth Circuit in Ohio 
Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co. by a three judge 
panel, with one judge dissenting and concurring in part.159  The court 
found that the Corps’ regulations were unambiguous and authorized the 
404 permit under the CWA, allowing permittees to create valley fills and 
bury intermittent streams by creating an underdrain system.160  Ohio 
 
152. Id. at 1282. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 1285–86 (S.D. W.Va. 1989) (stating “[q]uestions as to the respective agencies’ 
authority center upon the nature of the substance being discharged, the Army generally having 
authority over the discharge of fill, [and] EPA having authority over the discharge of pollutants”). 
155. Id. at 1289–90 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 232(q)(4) and stating that exclusion of waste 
treatment ponds was never intended to apply to ponds constructed in United States Waters). 
156. See id. at 1290 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 
(1945)) (“When the construction of an administrative regulation . . . is in issue, deference is even 
more clearly in order . . . ’[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which 
becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”). 
157. Id. at 1293. 
158. Id.  
159. 556 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir 2009). 
160. See id. at 189 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000)) (stating the Corps “may issue permits 
for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites” 
as long as the permits meet the standards set forth in SMCRA) (emphasis added).  In this case, 
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Valley Environmental Coalition (OVEC) contended the fill was actually 
pollutants, and therefore fell under the regulation of the EPA—not the 
Corps.161  The Fourth Circuit delineated the various responsibilities and 
controls of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), SMCRA, 
CWA, the Army Corps of Engineers, and West Virginia Department of 
Environmental Protection (WVDEP), and concluded that the “control and 
responsibility” beyond the filling of the valleys and buried intermittent 
streams remained with the state regulatory agency, WVDEP.162  OVEC 
challenged the Corps’ assessment of the environmental impact of the 
valley fills.163  The court concluded the Corps followed CWA guidelines 
on the issuance of the 404 permit, and the permittee properly set forth 
plans to minimize and mitigate environmental impacts of the valley 
fill.164  In the court’s opinion, SMCRA struck a balance between 
environmental protection and coal mining as an essential source of 
energy.165  Furthermore, the court found in-stream settlement ponds 
represented the “best technology currently available” for treating runoff 
from valley fills.166  The court determined in-stream settlement ponds to 
be a necessary component of waste treatment systems because of 
Appalachia’s unique geology.167 
Ultimately, the controlling case law of the Appalachian region 
proposes that environmental impact studies fall under the jurisdiction of 
 
thirteen miles of streams were buried.  Id. at 217 (4th Cir 2009) (Michael, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part). 
161. See id. at 195–98 (stating the court could not accept OVEC’s argument that the larger 
valley fill project fell under the Corps’ authority because exclusive jurisdiction remains with the 
state agency complying with SMCRA).  The court also determined that a NEPA analysis for a 
valley fill would be duplicative and unnecessary if the state agency had previously conducted its 
own analysis.  Id. at 196. 
162. See id. at 197 (stating even if OVEC’s argument was assumed to be true, the regulation 
was “ambiguous” and the Corps’s interpretation was entitled to deference). 
163. Id. at 202–07. 
164. Id. 
165. See id. at 215–16 (insinuating SMCRA was an intervention into the control of the 
CWA’s mandate to regulate pollutants).  Further the court states the Corps’s interpretation that 
stream segments connecting valley fills to sediment ponds were “waste treatment systems” and not 
“waters of the United States” was reasonable, and therefore entitled to deference under Chevron 
and Seminole Rock analysis.  Id. 
166. Id. at 216. 
167. See id. (holding the impoundment of headwater streams to create an in-stream sediment 
pond are not to be deemed an impoundment of “waters of the United States,” but rather fall within 
the waste water exclusion). 
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state agencies which have met SMCRA and CWA guidelines.168  While 
the EPA retains the right to review the state permitting process,169 they 
may not require the state to duplicate scientific studies already 
completed.170  Valley fills and in-stream settlement ponds have been 
found to be a necessary part of strip mining in Appalachia,171 even 
though science has shown the process contributes to hydrological 
pollution.172   
D. The EPA’s Final Ruling on the Definition of “[W]aters of the 
United States” 
In an effort to make the process of identifying waters protected under 
the CWA “easier to understand, more predictable, and consistent with the 
law and peer-reviewed science,” the EPA clarified the definition of 
“waters of the United States” in 2015.173  The final promulgation of the 
rule establishes CWA’s authority to protect the waters of the United 
States.174  The EPA expressed its intention to simplify and standardize 
the procedures, “particularly as [it] affect[s] crossings of covered 
ephemeral and intermittent tributaries.”175  The final ruling on the 
definition of waters of the United States is based on prevailing Supreme 
Court decisions176 that explain the interconnectivity of waters of the 
 
168. See id. at 212, 216 (holding specifically that, “[u]Under SMCRA, states have 
‘exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations’ on 
non-Federal lands, so long as their regulatory program has been approved by the Secretary of the 
Interior as satisfying the Act’s minimum requirements.”). 
169. See id. at 190 (explaining NPDES programs must be approved by the EPA before they 
can begin issuing CWA § 402 permits). 
170. See id. at 196 (citing Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 884 F.2d 394, 401 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (“[O]rdinary notions of efficiency suggest a federal environmental review should not 
duplicate competently performed state environmental analyses.”). 
171. Id. at 187. 
172. See Shiber, supra note 4, at 337 (explaining coal mine piles and areas mined for 
decades are a “significant source of arsenic contamination in the region”). 
173. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,055 
(June 29, 2015) (codified as 33 C.F.R. § 328 & 40 C.F.R. §§ 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 
300, 302, & 401). 
174. Id. at 37,055 (applying CWA protection to “traditional navigable waters, interstate 
waters, and the territorial seas”). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 37,054 (citing U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid 
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); and Rapanos 
v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715 (2006)). 
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United States, including wetlands and other non-navigable waters.177  
The “significant nexus” test for determining whether a water is or is not 
a “waters of the United States” considers whether the water is 
“significantly related to the health of downstream waters by protecting 
the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of the water.”178  Science 
supports the contention that protecting upstream sources is critical to 
protecting downstream waters.179  In its definition, the EPA considered 
a report by the agency’s Science Advisory Board, which noted that waters 
are in many ways connected in the hydrological cycle through a 
continuum of connectivity.180  The variations of connectivity are integral 
to understanding the “waters” function in the larger context of “waters of 
the United States.”181  The definition recognizes two types of waters 
requiring a case-by-case analysis to determine their relationship to 
traditional navigable waters, as science is able to more expressively 
communicate the interconnectivity of waters of the United States.182   
A broader definition of “waters of the United States” allows the EPA 
to evaluate interconnectivity before precluding the source from  




178. Id. at 37,061 (citing U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Solid 
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); and Rapanos 
v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715 (2006)). 
179. Id. 
180. See id. at 37,057 (finding “[w]aters are connected in myriad ways, including physical 
connections and the hydrologic cycle; however, connections occur on a continuum or gradient from 
highly connected to highly isolated”).  
181. See id. (emphasizing the EPA’s Office of Research and Development’s report on the 
“[c]onnectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis of the 
Scientific Evidence” finding “variations in the degree of connectivity are a critical consideration to 
the ecological integrity and sustainability of downstream waters”). 
182. See id. at 37,057–58 (recognizing the eight jurisdictional water categories as traditional 
navigable waters, interstate waters, territorial seas, impoundments of jurisdictional waters, 
tributaries, adjacent waters, and “waters found after a case-specific analysis to have a significant 
nexus to traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or territorial seas, either alone or in 
combination with similarly situated waters in the region”).  The definition also notes contributing 
waters are “inextricably linked” to their downstream waters.  Id. at 37,067. 
183. See id. at 37,054 (narrowing the definition of “waters of the United States” due to 
previous rules placing qualifiers on existing types of water). 
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appreciates the complexity of water connectivity acknowledged by the 
Supreme Court in Rapanos.184   
Connectivity of streams and wetlands to downstream waters occurs along 
a gradient that can be described in terms of the frequency, duration, 
magnitude, timing, and rate of change of water  . . .  These terms, which 
we refer to collectively as connectivity descriptors, characterize the range 
over which streams and wetlands vary and shift along the connectivity 
gradient in response to changes in natural and [man-made] factors and, 
when considering a watershed context, can be used to predict probable 
effects of different degrees of connectivity over time.  The evidence 
unequivocally demonstrates that . . . riparian/floodplain wetlands . . . are 
clearly connected to downstream waters in ways that profoundly influence 
downstream water integrity.185  
The Supreme Court’s rulings combined with the underlying science 
support the position that intermittent and perennial streams characterizing 
the riparian wetlands of Appalachia should be evaluated on a case-by-
case basis.186  These streams should fall under the protection of the CWA 
before a 404 permit is approved.187  It is worth noting that significant 
and prodigious case law in some jurisdictions holds that “waters of the 
United States” retain their status in perpetuity.188  Promoting and 
establishing the nexus theory at trial could prove critical in establishing 
community harms downstream from surface mine sites.  
 
184. Id. at 37,059. 
185. Id. at 37,063. 
186. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 134–35 (1985). 
187. See id. at 134–35 (providing a unanimous opinion that the Corps’s conclusion that 
adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound with the “waters” of the United States).  “[W]e therefore 
conclude that a definition of ‘waters of the United States’ encompassing all wetlands adjacent to 
other bodies of water over which the Corps has jurisdiction is a permissible interpretation of the 
[Clean Water Act].”  Id. at 135. 
188. E.g., United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We do not see how 
a mere man-made diversion, however long ago undertaken, could change [a creek] from a water of 
the United States into something else.”).  But see H.R. 1105, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) H.R. 
1105 is, as the name of the bill suggests, focused on stopping the WOTUS Act by denying force 
and effect to the “Clean Water Rule” Definition of ‘Waters of the United States’” rule.   
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V.    LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES: KENTUCKY’S RELIANCE ON COAL 
A. Flooding 
Surface coal mining and reclamation constitute the dominant shift in 
land use in Central Appalachia over the last thirty years.189  After the 
overlying rock strata are exploded and the coal is extracted, mining 
companies attempt to return the land to its original contours.190  The 
remaining topsoil, if any was saved, is replaced and the reclaimed land is 
“revegetated.”191  Unfortunately, soil compaction caused by heavy 
machinery impedes rainfall from naturally filtering through the soil of the 
reclaimed mining site.192   
In 2009, flash flooding and mudslides destroyed 300 to 400 homes and 
left thousands of people without power and tens of thousands of people 
without water in East Kentucky.193  The Federal Emergency Disaster 
Management Agency (FEMA) provided assistance to individuals, 
households, businesses, and government agencies in Breathitt and Pike 
counties.194  897 applicants from Breathitt County were awarded $4 
million for assistance.195  After the flooding, a lawsuit was filed against 
four mining companies alleging a sediment pond failed and aggravated 
 
189. See Bethany N. Baxter, Cause and Effect: Surface Mine Reclamation and Flood 
Litigation in Appalachia, 4 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 135, 137 (2011) 
(admitting the mandated reclamation process is ineffective and widely criticized).  
190. See 405 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:190 § 2(1) (2017) (describing regulations mining 
companies must follow after they operate on an area of land); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN 
§ 350.415 (West 2017) (detailing the process of protecting land after it has been disturbed and layers 
of soil have been removed). 
191. See 405 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:200 (2017) (setting requirements for revegetation of 
areas affected by surface mining activities).  
192. See Joseph R. Ferrari, et al., Surface Mining and Reclamation Effects on Flood 
Response of Watersheds in the Central Appalachian Plateau, 45 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1, 1, 9 
(2009) (describing the difficulty of water absorption after heavy machinery has compacted soil). 
193. Dori Hjalmarson & Bill Estep, Hundreds Left Homeless After Eastern Kentucky 
Flooding, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (May 12, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www. 
kentucky.com/latest-news/article43998897.html [https://perma.cc/HPB9-AUZN]. 
194. Federal Disaster Assistance to Kentucky Tops $18.8 Million, FEMA (July 17, 2009), 
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2009/07/17/federal-disaster-assistance-kentucky-tops-188-
million [https://perma.cc/9TSG-ZBFN] [hereinafter Disaster Assistance]. 
195. Id. 
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the flooding.196  The four mining companies charged with improper 
reclamation of surface mine sites settled the lawsuit in mid-2011.197   
In July of the same year, Pike County residents experienced severe 
flooding on Harless Creek leaving two people dead, dozens of families 
displaced, and thousands of people without power and water.198  Damage 
was assessed by state officials at $8.6 million but was expected to reach 
$10 million.199  FEMA approved more than $5.5 million in federal 
disaster grants and loans.200  Pike County residents also filed suit, 
alleging violations of state reclamation regulations contributed to the 
flooding.201   
A recent long-term study evaluating reclaimed mine sites’ response to 
severe rainfall showed an increase in storm runoff by three times the 
normal amount, resulting in substantially higher flooding risks.202  
Researchers in Kentucky conducted similar scientific studies that 
produced similar results.203  These studies show that reclamation impairs 
the hydrological ability of the land to absorb rainfall in Appalachia, 
thereby exasperating the potential for severe flooding in a region known 
 
196. See Dori Hjalmarson, Mining Worsened 2009 Flooding in Breathitt County,  
Lawsuits Say, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (May 13, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.kentucky.com/news/state/kentucky/article44031897.html [https://perma.cc/PW9Q-
F63V] (alleging four named coal companies were responsible for allowing a sediment holding pond 
to breach, thereby increasing flooding).  
197. See Dori Hjalmarson, 4 Coal Companies Settle 2009 Mine Lawsuit Filed by Breathitt 
Residents, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (Apr. 29, 2011, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.kentucky.com/news/local/crime/article44092605.html [https://perma.cc/8S9N-2SU3] 
(explaining the impact an engineering study had on the evidence against coal companies).  The 
study showed variance in usage of rocky soil, rather than absorbent topsoil, leading to an inability 
to absorb rainfall.  Id. 
198. Dori Hjalmarson, Officials Say Pike Flood Damage is the Worst in Years,  
LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (July 20, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.kentucky.com/ 
news/state/kentucky/article44040834.html [https://perma.cc/RX56-5LL6]. 
199. Dori Hjalmarson, Damage from Pike Flood Expected to Reach $10 Million, 
LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (July 22, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://www.kentucky.com/latest-
news/article44041326.html [https://perma.cc/4WPR-JFQG]. 
200. Kentucky Disaster Assistance for Flooding Tops $5.5 Million, FEMA (Aug. 6, 2010), 
http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2010/08/06/kentucky-disaster-assistance-july-flooding-tops-
55-million [https://perma.cc/3N27-GLG7] [hereinafter Kentucky Disaster Assistance]. 
201. Baxter, supra note 189, at 140–41. 
202. See Ferrari, et al., supra note 192, at 8 (evaluating reclaimed mine sites and their 
response to severe rainfall). 
203. See id. (affirming the results of previous empirical studies on a smaller scale). 
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for heavy rains and flash flooding.204  Reclamation contributes not only 
to the increase in severity of flooding, but also the costs borne by the 
federal government stemming from local residents applying for loans or 
assistance to rebuild communities ravaged by flooding.205 
B. Water Quality 
Surface mining degrades stream habitat and water quality.206  
Groundwater and surface waters are often encumbered with dissolved 
solutes and ions that increase the conductivity of the stream and change 
the acidic balance of the waters.207  When coal is heavily pyritic, acid 
mine drainage becomes an environmental concern.208  Over time, 
changes in water chemistry may destroy the biodiversity of the 
streams.209  Although reclamation attempts to alleviate the consequences 
of surface mining in Appalachia, it is undeniable that surface coal mining 
negatively impacts the stream chemistry and ecology of Appalachia.210  
A 2013 study from Ohio found elevated lead and sulfate amounts as well 
as conductivity levels high enough to affect aquatic organisms in streams 
near surface mining sites reclaimed two to twenty-five years ago.211 
The scientific data suggests not only that surface mining has an 
immediate impact on the hydrology of the landscape, but also that 
reclaimed surface mine sites continue to have long-lasting effects on the 
surrounding environment.212  Reclamation was intended to mitigate the 
adverse effects of surface mining.  However, the continued existence of 
 
204. See id. at 9–10 (finding an increase in flood response as mine reclamation reaches 
higher proportions of watershed area). 
205. See Disaster Assistance, supra note 194 (identifying FEMA-approved grants and SBA 
disaster loans total approximately $18 million dollars); Kentucky Disaster Assistance, supra note 
200. 
206. See Hopkins II et al., supra note 11, at 87 (citing studies that show surface mining 
correlates to “modifying topography, removing vegetation, exposing previously buried geologic 
materials, and even directly burying streams”). 
207. See id. at 87–88 (indicating additional chemicals found in groundwater, such as sulfate, 
iron, aluminum, and selenium). 
208. Id. at 88. 
209. See id. (stating surface mining causes extinction of local species in affected streams 
and increases risks to human health). 
210. Id. 
211. See id. at 89, 91–93 (stating lead levels detected were “extraordinarily high given the 
US EPA maximum contaminant level of 15 ppb for drinking water”). 
212. Id. at 91. 
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pollution decades after the reclamation process ended supports the 
assertion that reclamation as implemented fails to achieve its stated goals 
under SMCRA.213   
C. Community Health 
Appalachia is a moderately, but thoroughly populated region.214  
Appalachian residents attribute exposure to air and water from coal 
mining sites for many of the chronic illnesses plaguing their 
communities.215  A series of statistical surveys conducted by Michael 
Hendryx compared mortality rates from heavy coal mining counties with 
mortality rates from non-mining counties in Appalachia and throughout 
the United States.216  Hendryx’s studies accounted for known variables 
and identified an independent link to increased mortality in areas with 
heavy coal mining.217  Counties with long-term mining operations have 
more pronounced mortality rates due to chronic heart, respiratory, and 
kidney diseases.218  Furthermore, the research suggests the general 
population in Appalachian coal mining counties has an increased 
likelihood of exposure to toxic airborne particles.219  Although only 1% 
of the Appalachian population works for the mining industry or has direct 
contact with the mining industry,220 the health consequences are found 
 
213. See id. at 88, 91 (concluding that despite best intentions, reclamation failed to ease 
long-term effects of surface mining). 
214. See KELVIN POLLARD & LINDA A. JACOBSEN, THE APPALACHIAN REGION IN 2010: A 
CENSUS DATA OVERVIEW, 2–5 (2011) (finding the average population was between fifty and 
eighty-seven people per square mile in certain Appalachian counties in 2010). 
215. Lung Cancer, supra note 37 at 2. 
216. See id. at 3 (defining “heavy coal mining” as counties that produced over 3 million 
tons of coal a year); Mortality, supra note 42, at 243 (comparing mortality rates from certain chronic 
illnesses in heavy coal-mining Appalachian counties with lower coal-mining Appalachian counties, 
non-coal mining Appalachian counties, and non-coal mining U.S. counties); Hendryx & Ahern, 
supra note 27, at 541 (examining “elevated mortality rates in Appalachian coal mining 
areas . . . and estimat[ing] the corresponding value of statistical life lost relative to the economic 
benefits of the coal mining industry”). 
217. See Lung Cancer, supra note 37 at 4 (explaining that after accounting for factors such 
as poverty and smoking, the study still found more than 144 deaths from lung cancer in Appalachian 
coal-mining communities when compared to non-mining communities). 
218. See Mortality, supra note 42, at 247 (stating the prevalence of chronic illness due to 
exposure is “hypothesized to be a long-term phenomena” due to large coal reserves being mined 
for “decades”). 
219. Lung Cancer, supra note 37 at 5. 
220. Id. 
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in all citizens including women and children not employed by the 
industry.221 
Pollutants increase the risk of heart, lung, and kidney disease.222  Coal 
contains zinc, cadmium, lead, mercury, arsenic, and other toxins, while 
the cleaning and processing of coal adds even more impurities.223  When 
coal is mined and processed, large quantities of ambient particulate 
matter escape into the air and water.224  Notably, independent studies 
outside of Appalachia show that even low level exposure to lead, 
mercury, arsenic, and cadmium increases the risk of mortality from heart 
and kidney disease.225  Many Appalachian residents access water 
through private wells, and according to a U.S. geological survey, wells 
located near reclaimed surface mine sites have higher levels of aluminum, 
iron, and manganese.226   
High poverty and unemployment rates, and low high school and 
college graduation rates, are common symptoms of higher mortality rates 
in coal mining communities in Appalachia.227  While many studies find 
high mortality rates are linked to smoking, poverty, poor education, and 
 
221. Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 27, at 547. 
222. Mortality, supra note 42, at 243. 
223. See id. at 244 (providing other studies that report elevated arsenic levels in water 
sources around mine sites); Shiber, supra note 4, at 337 (stating most diseases associated with water 
arsenic exposure including “bladder, urinary tract, skin and lung cancers, cardiovascular diseases, 
and non-insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus” occur more frequently in Appalachia).  
224. Mortality, supra note 42, at 244. 
225. See Jaymie R. Meliker, et al., Arsenic in Drinking Water and Cerebrovascular Disease, 
Diabetes Mellitus, and Kidney Disease in Michigan: A Standardized Mortality Ratio Analysis, 6 
ENVTL. HEALTH 4 (2007) (finding arsenic in drinking water increases mortality from heart and 
kidney disease). 
226. STEVEN D. MCAULEY & MARK D. KOZAR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY SCI. 
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2006-5059, GROUND-WATER QUALITY IN UNMINED AREAS AND NEAR 
RECLAIMED SURFACE COAL MINES IN THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL APPALACHIAN COAL 
REGIONS, PENNSYLVANIA AND WEST VIRGINIA 32–33 (2006); Mortality, supra note 42, at 244. 
227. See Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 27, at 544 (noting the stark contrasts between 
Appalachian counties with coal mining above the median as compared to the rest of the nation).  
Appalachian counties had a median household income of $28,287, a poverty rate of 18%, 69.8% 
of adults with a high school education, 11.2% of adults with a college education, and a 7.0% 
unemployment rate; whereas the rest of the nation had a median household income of $36,622, a 
poverty rate of 13.3%, 78.3% of adults with a high school education, 17.0% of adults with a college 
education, and a 4.7% unemployment rate.  Id.  
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other covariates,228 Hendryx’s studies adjusted for these known 
outcome-determinative variables.229  His studies reveal high mortality 
risks in both men and women in Appalachian counties with mining 
operations.230  “Total and chronic heart, respiratory[,] and kidney disease 
mortality rates are significantly higher in coal mining areas of Appalachia 
compared to non-mining areas of the country.”231  High poverty rates, 
high unemployment rates, and poor education in Appalachian 
communities also dispel the myth that mining benefits the surrounding 
community by creating jobs.232  In Mortality in Appalachian Coal 
Mining Regions: The Value of Statistical Life Lost, Hendryx conducted a 
cost-benefit analysis measuring the economic contribution of the coal 
mining industry in Appalachia at $8.09 billion.233  The analysis showed 
surface coal mining exacts a heavy price in health costs and lost income 
due to higher mortality risks in Appalachian coal mining communities, 
which costs $18.166 billion per year.234 
D. Dependence: The Cost of Subsidies 
In 2006, the Mountain Association for Community Economic 
Development (MACED) investigated Kentucky’s economic relationship 
 
228. See Mortality, supra note 42, at 244 (providing many believed higher mortality rates 
in Appalachia resulted from poor diet and health habits combined with limited access to health 
care). 
229. See id. (adjusting for covariates including: smoking rate, male population, college and 
high school education rates, poverty rates, race and ethnicity rates, health un-insurance rates, 
physician supply, rural-urban continuum code, and Southern state). 
230. See id. at 247 (hypothesizing coal mining exposes entire communities to environmental 
toxins, not only those working directly with the coal mining industry, who predominantly have 
been men). 
231. Id.; see also Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 27, at 547 (stating “[e]levated adjusted 
mortality occurred in both males and females, suggesting that the effects were not due to 
occupational exposure, as almost all coal miners are men”). 
232. See Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 27, at 547 (explaining coal mining is correlated with 
higher unemployment and poverty rates compared to non-coal-mining regions). 
233. See id. at 546 (measuring the coal mining industry’s contribution in 2005 at $6.5 billion 
dollars in state income after coal severance taxes).  Elevated stress, environmental degradation, and 
socioeconomic disadvantage were not accounted for in the study, but should be considered when 
evaluating community health in connection to the coal mining industry.  See id. at 547 (stating coal 
dependent economies experience a mean net loss of population over time).   
234. See Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 27, at 541–46 (reporting empirical results showing 
a range of economic costs in the several billions).  Hendryx’s study estimated the cost of a human 
life between $3.8 million and $6.3 million in 2000 and adjusting for the consumer price index 
between 2000 and 2005. Id. 
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to the coal mining industry.235  The investigation considered the costs 
and benefits to local and state economies balanced against the challenges 
of economic development to more sustainable sources.236  Compared to 
the rest of the United States, Kentucky ranks 47th in per capita income, 
falling from its 1970 ranking of 44th in the United States.237  Eastern 
Kentucky, the most heavily mined area in the state, is home to some of 
the poorest counties in the United States.238   
The coal industry states that it creates jobs, lowers electricity rates, and 
generates tax revenue.239  While coal mining only represents 1% of 
employment in Kentucky, the proportional rates are much higher in 
counties with heavy coal mining operations.240  The 2006 MACED 
investigation found direct employment in the coal industry generated $83 
million in tax revenue.241  Additionally, the coal industry creates 
downstream employment in related and non-related sectors, generating 
an estimated $142 million in revenue.242  The coal industry paid a total 
of $303 million in taxes in 2006, including $224 million in coal-severance 
 
235. See KONTY & BAILEY, supra note 40, at 1 (showing empirical analysis of the coal 
industry’s fiscal impact on Kentucky). 
236. See id. at 1–4 (stating the study highlights the downward trends in employment and 
coal industry revenue over the last thirty years while contending that coal is a limited resource).  
The 1970s also marked a transition from conventional mining to surface mining.  See JOEL 
DARMSTADTER, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, PRODUCTIVITY CHANGE IN U.S. COAL MINING  
8–13 (1997) https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/10874/1/dp970040.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M5LY-8CNE] (describing some of the efficiencies associated with surface mining compared to 
underground mining). 
237. 2010: Statistical Abstract: State Rankings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/library/publications/2009/compendia/statab/129ed/rankings.html [https:// 
perma.cc/C37F-D6SR] [hereinafter 2010 Statistical Abstract] (last updated Sept. 3, 2015); KONTY 
& BAILEY, supra note 40, at 23. 
238. 2010 Statistical Abstract, supra note 237. 
239. See ARON PATRICK ET AL., KY. ENERGY AND ENV’T CABINET, DEP’T FOR ENERGY 
DEV. AND INDEP., & KY. COAL ASS’N, KENTUCKY COAL FACTS 3, 56 (14th ed. 2014) (noting an 
11.8% decrease in production, a 15.5% decrease in employment, and the second lowest electricity 
price in the country).  
240. See KONTY & BAILEY, supra note 40, at 17–18, 23 (stating Kentucky’s coal  
industry, in 2006, employed 17,669 individuals who were paying sales tax, personal income tax, 
property tax and motor vehicle taxes); see also Employment, KY. COAL EDUC., 
http://www.coaleducation.org/ky_coal_facts/employment/ky_employment.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
5YDM-L54Y] (last visited Sept. 4, 2017) (citing statistics showing the downward trend in 
employment from 47,190 in 1979 to 17,959 in 2006).  
241. KONTY & BAILEY, supra note 40, at 18. 
242. Id. at 20. 
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tax, sales tax on coal company purchases, corporate income tax, and other 
related taxes.243  However, Kentucky expended nearly $240 million 
maintaining the coal haul road system that same year.244  Furthermore, 
the state subsidizes the coal industry245 and governmental services for 
all direct and indirect employees of the mining industry.246  While the 
study admits the near impossibility of generating precise figures, it 
concluded the total net impact of the coal industry on Kentucky in 2006 
was a $115 million cost to the state.247 
The 2006 MACED study was based on a prior study conducted in 1986 
claiming a $130 million cost in 1985.248  It is noteworthy that other 
Appalachian regions with long-term relationships with the coal industry 
replicated the study and found similar results.249  Contrary to the 
industry’s assertion and in spite of the direct and indirect injection of 
revenue to the state and local economies, the coal industry externalizes a 
greater cost to surrounding communities that remains unquantified and 
uncalculated.250 
 
243. Id. at 9. 
244. Id. at 14.  The coal haul road system are the roads, bridges, and highways in Appalachia 
used to transport coal from the mine site.  Because the trucks are loaded with tons of material, the 
damage to the road system is significant and costly to maintain. Id.  
245. See id. at 11–16 (discussing a variety of tax exemptions and tax expenditures available 
to the mining industry that diminish state revenues). In 2006, coal’s share of the “Energy and 
Energy Producing Fuels” tax expenditure (subsidy) was $5.8 million.  Transportation expenditures 
are also deductible; in 2006 “expenses incurred in transporting coal from the mine mouth or pit to 
a processing plant, tipple, loading dock, or customer is [also] deductible in computing gross value” 
resulted in a $17.7 million tax expenditure.  Id. at 12–13. 
246. See id. at 18, 21 (indicating substantial revenue is used to provide educational and 
infrastructural needs, as well as other public services, such as schools, transportation, and roads). 
247. See id. at 22–23 (noting the study did not include externalized costs of “healthcare, lost 
productivity resulting from injury and health impacts, water treatment, water infrastructure to 
replace damaged wells, environmental remediation . . . social spending associated with declines in 
coal employment”). 
248. See id. at 8 (projecting an impact of approximately $57 million in 2000). 
249. See RORY MCILMOIL, ET AL., DOWNSTREAM STRATEGIES, THE IMPACT OF COAL ON 
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE BUDGET 53 (2012) (noting coal industry activity has generated over 
$400,000 dollars from direct coal employment); RORY MCILMOIL, ET AL., THE IMPACT OF COAL 
ON THE VIRGINIA STATE BUDGET 46 (2012) (noting the total revenues contributed by the Virginia 
coal industry totaled over $15 million dollars); RORY MCILMOIL ET AL., DOWNSTREAM 
STRATEGIES, THE IMPACT OF COAL ON THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE BUDGET 51 (2010) (noting 
revenues from coal-related employment generated about $170 million dollars). 
250. See, e.g., RORY MCILMOIL ET AL., THE IMPACT OF COAL ON THE VIRGINIA STATE 
BUDGET 47 (2012) (emphasizing health costs, loss of property tax revenue to support public 
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The long-term harms of surface coal mining in Appalachia are 
significant and substantial including but not limited to property damage, 
environmental degradation, and personal injury from the decades of 
pollution accumulating in the local environment.  Scientific evidence 
supports the assertion that surface mining in local Appalachian 
communities increases the risk of serious illnesses and death.  
Considering the environmental and human health costs of surface mining, 
the industry has an incentive to reduce the harm or pay the price of 
making citizens and communities whole.  
VI.    ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES 
A. From the First to the Third Restatement 
Under the First Restatement, an activity is ultra-hazardous if it “(a) 
necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land[,] or 
chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the utmost care, and (b) 
is not a matter of common usage[.]”251  The Second Restatement of Torts 
§ 520 evaluates abnormally dangerous activities through a series of six 
factors.252  One factor considers “the high degree of risk of some 
harm[,]” while another factor evaluates whether “the harm that results 
from [the activity is likely to] be great.”253  The predominant 
characteristic of strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity is the 
finding of liability, even when the activity is conducted with the “utmost 
care.”254 
The Third Restatement of Torts § 20 combines those six factors into a 
single element, questioning whether the activity involves a “highly 
 
education, and disaster recovery in Appalachian communities are not included as costs in this and 
other similar reports, but should be investigated further by the state). 
251. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520(a) & (b) (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 520(a)–(f) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977) (determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to 
be considered: (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land[,] or chattels 
of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the 
risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common 
usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which 
its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes”). 
253. Id § 520(a) & (b). 
254. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 Reporters’ Note cmt. 
h (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
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significant risk of physical harm.”255  Thus, a harm may be “highly 
significant” if it has an “especially high likelihood of harm, or an 
especially great severity of harm.”256  The second element of an 
abnormally dangerous activity under the Third Restatement is that “the 
activity is not one of common usage.”257  When a court rules that an 
activity is abnormally dangerous as a matter of law, the defendant and 
those in the defendant’s position, have a strong incentive to make prudent 
decisions.258  Because the defendant is the actor, the defendant is in the 
best position to consider and implement those precautions to reduce the 
risk of harm.259  Strict liability holds the defendant responsible for 
choices that might escape the attention of the courts under negligence 
theories of liability.260  While negligence cases may never fully examine 
the “reasonableness” and “degree of activity” of the defendant’s choice, 
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities under the Third 
Restatement assumes the activity’s value is irrelevant to the question of 
whether liability lies with the defendant.261  A reasonable actor assumes 
the risks involved with the activity are worth the future value gained and, 
as a matter of fairness, should be liable for damages caused by the activity 
and incurred by others.262  
B. Elements of Analysis 
As noted above, the “risk of harm” may be highly significant for either 
the “high risk of harm” element or the “severity of the expected harm” 
 
255. Id § 20(b)(1). 
256. Id.§ 20 cmt. g (emphasis added). 
257. Id. § 20(b)(2). 
258. Id. § 20 Reporters’ Note cmt. b. 
259. Id.§ 20 cmt. e.  Causation becomes crucial to a finding of strict liability.  Id. § 20 cmt. 
h (AM. LAW INST. 2012).  Courts hold the causation of harm normally rests at the intersection of 
multiple activities by both defendant and plaintiff.  Id.  A judge should make a finding of strict 
liability when the “defendant[‘]s role is sufficiently exclusive as to render the imposition of strict 
liability appropriate.”  Id. 
260. Id. § 20 cmt. b. 
261. See id. § 20 cmt. l & Reporters’ Note cmt. b (noting that under a negligence theory 
under § 3, an accounting of the benefits foregone by the defendant are weighed against abstaining 
from the activity).  This is a highly manipulatable balancing test where benefits may be 
characterized as personal benefits, benefits to the local community, or benefits to society as a whole.  
Id. § 20 cmt. l.  The greater the perceived benefits, the less likely the defendant’s choice to engage 
in those activities is negligent.  Id. 
262. Id. § 20 cmt. f. 
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element.263  Some activities conducted in the absence of negligence for 
long periods of time could be expected to bring about eventual 
injuries.264  Since the likelihood of these injuries may be minimized over 
time, a showing of serious injuries to a number of persons will be required 
to establish the type of severity that justifies a finding of a highly 
significant risk.265  The strict liability case is strengthened by showing 
the defendant had actual knowledge or should have known of the risks at 
the time of the conduct that resulted in the plaintiff’s injuries.266  The 
reasonable care of all parties is irrelevant under § 20 of the Third 
Restatement as strict liability protects “the innocent person who suffers 
harm as a result of [an] unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in the 
defendant’s activity.”267  Generally, courts have found an activity to be 
abnormally dangerous when risks cannot be eliminated by reasonable or 
even utmost care.268   
Even though a court may find that an activity poses a highly significant 
risk despite reasonable care, the activity is not abnormally dangerous if it 
 
263. Id. § 20 cmt. g. 
264. See id. § 20 cmt. g (stating an absence of highly significant risks is one reason why 
courts are unwilling to impose strict liability due to prospective harm). 
265. Id. § 20 Reporters’ Notes cmt. g.  In the case of surface mining in Appalachia, the risk 
of immediate harm from flooding and long-term serious health consequences coexists with 
impending serious health risks to passive communities.  See Gregory Wallace, et al., Interior Dept. 
Halts Study Into Appalachian Mining Technique’s Likely Health Hazards, CNN (Aug. 23, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/22/politics/appalachian-coal-mining-health-study/index.html [https: 
//perma.cc/ZG3A-9P5Z] (linking surface mining to increased lung and kidney disease rates, as well 
as higher death rates); Glynis Board, The Flood Next Time: Warming Raises the Risk of Disaster, 
OHIOVALLEYRESOURCE (July 22, 2016), http://ohiovalleyresource.org/2016/07/22/flood-next-
time-warming-raises-risk-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/XHX6-2EU6] (noting an increase in rainfall 
intensity in Appalachia). 
266. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. i (AM. LAW 
INST. 2012) (stating a defendant disposing of toxic chemicals should know of their harmful quality, 
making a finding the activity is abnormally dangerous appropriate). 
267. Id. § 20 cmt. h. 
268. See id. § 20 Reporters’ Notes cmt. h (listing a number of cases from different 
jurisdictions that have made their determination on the inability of minimizing risks with the 
exercise of reasonable care); see also Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous 
Activity:  The Negligence Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 622 (1999) (noting that after a 
review of cases applying the Second Restatement’s § 520 factors, courts treated the ineffectiveness 
of eliminating risks as “especially . . . indispensable” in an affirmative finding of abnormally 
dangerous activity).  The Reporters of the Third Restatement found the same evidence to support 
this multi-jurisdictional assertion. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 
Reporters’ Notes cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
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is of common usage.269  Common usage may turn on whether an activity 
is a non-natural use, a standard developed in Rylands v. Fletcher.270  An 
activity may be of common usage when carried on by a large portion of 
the community, thereby making the activity a natural use.271  In some 
cases, a determination of common use may be found when only a limited 
number of actors conduct the activity, such as the transmission of 
electricity or gas pipelines.272  The scope of common usage may be 
broadened if the activity is “common and familiar within the 
community.”273  However, the Third Restatement explains the concept 
of “common usage” should be particularly conscious of public attitudes 
regarding the activity.274   
A finding that an activity was of common usage under the Second 
Restatement’s analysis was merely one of six factors that also included 
“inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on” and 
“extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its 
dangerous attributes.”275  While § 520 vaguely separates common usage 
from other factors, an estimation of factors (e) and (f) reveals that they 
incoherently bleed into the concept of common usage.276  The social-
value factor established in the Second Restatement is out of step with 
 
269. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20(b)(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
2012). 
270. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.1868).  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2012). Location can be an important 
distinguishing element in the determination of whether an activity is a non-natural use.  Id.  For 
example, a reservoir in an arid environment might be natural and necessary, whereas a reservoir on 
a hill looming above a city may not.  Id. § 20 cmt. k. These findings are particularly fact dependent.  
Id. § 20 cmt. k. 
271. See id. § 20 cmt. j (stating the idea of reciprocity often determines whether a 
perceptively dangerous activity, such as driving an automobile, is considered abnormally 
dangerous). If most members engage in the activity, then the risks are shared equally throughout 
the community.  Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. See id. § (stating “[w]hen an activity has moved beyond its initial stages and has 
become common and normal, [it] tends to allay concerns as to the acceptability of the activity 
itself”). 
275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 520 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977) (noting (d), (e), and (f) could be heavily weighted to excuse activities that were of 
economic importance to local communities). 
276. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 
2012).  
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strict liability.277  Prosser and Keeton’s treatise on torts finds that the 
Second Restatement’s view on abnormally dangerous activity is 
unsatisfactory.278  The Third Restatement’s review of the cases came to 
a similar conclusion that the frequently mentioned “social-value factor” 
was not given as much weight as unavoidable danger and common 
usage.279  The Third Restatement provides a simpler analysis of 
abnormally dangerous activities by settling on common usage.280   
C. The Role of the Judge 
The court determines whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, not 
the jury.281  The Third Restatement limits the number of factors 
considered in the court’s determination.282  However, an expanded 
comment l emphasizes that the court may rely on judicial notice to 
acquire information about the activity and that fact-finding may be 
 
277. See Joseph H. King Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for 
Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 371 (1996) (“The value-to-the-
community factor has been criticized by some commentators who have regarded it as inconsistent 
with the conceptual separateness of strict liability . . . .”); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. E (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“The appeal of strict liability, it can be 
noted, does not depend on any notion that the defendant is in a better position than the plaintiff to 
allocate or distribute the risk of harm.”); But see Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., 
835 F. Supp. 959, 971 (W.D. Ky. 1993).  In Lamb, the court found the enrichment of uranium to 
be an activity carried out as a matter of public necessity. Id. at 971 (indicating the enriched uranium 
was designated for reactors that were integral to domestic energy production and weapons 
production that played a significant role in national defense).  A finding of public necessity (social-
value) would have prevented application of strict liability under Kentucky law to defendant 
uranium enricher, had the case not been resolved on other grounds.  Id. 
278. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 555 (5th 
ed. 1984) (recommending return to the First Restatement of Torts). 
279. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 
2012). 
280. Id. § 20 cmt. j. 
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. l (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  But see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. l (AM. LAW INST. 2012) 
(noting two jurisdictions that have left the determination to the jury, citing Harper v. Regency Dev. 
Co., 399 So.2d 248 (Ala. 1981) & Zero Wholesale Gas Co. v. Stroud, 571 S.W.2d (Ark. 1978)).  
Of note is Koger v. Ferrin, deciding that when the facts attributed to the activity are in dispute, the 
jury should decide the relevant factual findings.  Koger v. Ferrin, 926 P.2d 680 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1996).  While the findings may rest with the jury, the final determination on the issue presumably 
lies with the court.  Id. 
282. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. l (AM. LAW INST. 
2012). 
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provided by expert testimony.283  “The facts in question concern an 
entire class of activities within society, rather than the conduct of the 
particular defendant.”284  It is the plaintiff’s obligation to provide 
compelling factual support to explain why strict liability should apply.285  
The imposition of strict liability on any activity will undoubtedly have a 
broad societal impact, and therefore should be properly supported.286   
VII.    APPLYING § 20 OF THE THIRD RESTATEMENT 
A. Surface Mining in Appalachia 
Often, the location of the defendant’s conduct plays a significant role 
in evaluating the risk involved.287  Under the Second Restatement, the 
location’s appropriateness is an independent factor, but the Reporter’s 
Notes in the Third Restatement suggest it is a dependent variable.288  The 
Third Restatement proposes that a court may differentiate between 
appropriate and inappropriate locations based on whether an assumption 




285. See id. § 20 cmt. e (rejecting plaintiff’s claim in Ballard v. Buckley Powder Co., 60 F. 
Supp. 2d 1180 (D. Kan. 1999) for failure to introduce evidence establishing strict-liability factors); 
see also id. § 20 cmt. l (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 520 
(AM. LAW INST. 1977)) (explaining these claims fail frequently because the plaintiff fails to meet 
this burden adequately). 
286. See id. § 20 cmt. l (stating the advantages of the court’s decision gives parties notice, 
avoids differing outcomes by jurisdiction, and reduces litigation).  Comment l notes the court’s 
decision implicates the concerns in § 7, Comment i, and § 8, Comment c.  Id.  Section 8, Comment 
c suggests that while “[t]ort law has thus accepted an ethics of particularism [that] tends to cast 
doubt on the viability of general rules of producing determinate results and requires that actual 
moral judgments be based on the circumstances of each individual situation.”  Id. § 20 cmt. c.  
Settling the issue of whether surface mining in Appalachia is an abnormally dangerous activity is 
appropriate for the state’s highest court.  Ballard v. Buckley Powder Co., 60 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (D. 
Kan. 1999).  However, the issue must be raised and litigated within the lower courts.  Id.  A strong 
factual record of the recognized societal harms and particularized injuries of the case at the trial 
level provide the strongest opportunity to prevail. See id. (clarifying plaintiff must have supporting 
facts of strict liability to prevail).  
287. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. g (AM. LAW 
INST. 2012) (explaining blasting on an uninhabited mountain does not involve a major risk, unlike 
blasting in a residential area). 
288. See id. § 20 Reporter’s Notes cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (suggesting reservoirs for 
storing water in arid communities are not abnormally dangerous, whereas the storage of water in 
high rainfall areas could be found strictly liable for harm from storage failure). 
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occurring.289  This can hardly be the case in Appalachia considering the 
low employment rates in the coal industry and the correlating high 
unemployment rates in the community290 which illustrate the undue 
influence of a unilateral relationship.291  The one-sided nature of the 
relationship is evidenced by the long-term effects of surface mining on 
local communities in a subsidized industry292 that externalizes its 
costs,293 and often refuses legal and financial obligations under state and 
federal law.294  Furthermore, the Third Restatement asks the court to 
consider public attitudes within the community.295  
Both the Second and Third Restatements describe a hypothetical where 
blasting on an uninhabited mountainside is not abnormally dangerous, 
but the same activity becomes abnormally dangerous in a populated 
area.296  Appalachia is not an abandoned mountainside, yet SMCRA 
allows blasting within 300 feet of a residence.297  Furthermore, surface 
mining in Appalachia increases the risk of flooding.298  This is not a new 
phenomenon; the reoccurring failure of sediment ponds is historically 
 
289. Id. § 20 Reporter’s Notes cmt. k. 
290. See KONTY & BAILEY, supra note 40, at 17 (admitting the coal industry impacts 
employment on a county-scale, but contrasts that supposition by indicating coal-industry 
employment is relatively small). 
291. 2010 Statistical Abstract, supra note 237. 
292. KONTY & BAILEY, supra note 40, at 4. 
293. Id. at  2. 
294. Interview with Mary V. Cromer, supra note 98. 
295. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 
2012). 
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 520 cmt. j (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. k (AM. LAW 
INST. 2012).  
297. 30 C.F.R. § 761.11 (e) (2016); see Ky. Stone Co. v. Gaddie, 396 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Ky. 
1965) (holding that “[i]t is our view that blasting is such an inherently dangerous operation that a 
landowner . . . may not insulate himself from liability flowing from blasting on his premises merely 
entrusting the task to an independent contractor.”). 
298. See B.A. Bryan & J.D. Hewlett, Effect of Surface Mining on Storm Flow and Peak 
Flow from Six Small Basins in Eastern Kentucky, 17 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 290, 298 (1981) 
(concluding “minor increases in mean storm flow volumes and the apparent reduction in the larger 
storm flows, together, clearly imply no appreciable increase in flood water discharge from the 
surface mined basins”).  But see In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d 863, 874 (W.Va. 2004) (holding 
coal mining was not abnormally dangerous and did not contribute to a higher risk of flash flooding 
in such a way that the risk could not be diminished by the exercise of due care).  
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well established.299  Surface mining substantially degrades water quality 
in surrounding areas affecting local drinking water.300  Reclamation’s 
mitigating promises have proved unfounded in the long-term studies of 
communities near surface mining sites.301  Studies show the pollution of 
private wells surrounding surface mine sites,302 and the disproportionate 
health impacts lead to higher mortality rates regardless of the 
population’s direct or indirect association with surface mining.303  
Surface mining in Appalachia is a practice forced on the surrounding 
community, met by public outrage, and litigation for over fifty years.304  
Not only has surface mining undermined the preference for conventional 
mining, it has directly and indirectly devastated Appalachia.305  The 
reciprocity that favors negligence theory over strict liability cannot be 
 
299. See Buffalo Creek, W. VA. DIVISION OF CULTURE & HIST., 
http://www.wvculture.org/history/buffcreek/buff1.html [https://perma.cc/7HVF-2Q32] (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2017) (describing a previous flooding incident in Buffalo Creek); Residents of 
Southern Appalachia Regard Coal Slurry Dams as Looming Threats, FREE SPEECH RADIO NEWS 
(May 28, 2014), https://fsrn.org/2014/05/residents-of-southern-appalachia-regard-coal-slurry-
dams-as-looming-threats/ [https://perma.cc/UPR7-XDE5] [hereinafter Residents of Southern 
Appalachia] (reporting the Office of Surface Mining tested seven different impoundments and only 
16 of 73 tests met minimum standards). 
300. Hopkins II et al., supra note 11, at 87. 
301. See Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 27, at 541 (concluding the “human cost of the 
Appalachian coal-mining economy outweighs its economic benefit”); Hopkins II et al., supra note 
11, at 91–93 (reporting on the long-term impacts of surface mining). 
302. Shiber, supra note 4, at 327; see MCAULEY & KOZAR, supra note 226, at 1 (stating 
sampled wells near reclaimed surface coal mines showed higher levels of aluminum, iron, and 
manganese compared to wells in unmined sites). 
303. See Mortality, supra note 42, at 243 (concluding “higher chronic heart, respiratory[,] 
and kidney disease mortality in coal mining areas may partially reflect environmental exposure to 
particulate matter or toxic agents present in coal and released in its mining and processing”); see 
also Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 27, at 547 (identifying higher mortality rates in areas with higher 
mining). 
304. See CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 65–66 (“[G]enerations of litigation between coal and 
timber companies and the mountaineers . . . eventually stripped away from the highlander much of 
the land which had supported his rugged independence for so long.”). 
305. Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 27, at 547.  
It is instantly apparent that this method of recovery is vastly cheaper than shaft or drift mining . . .  
When the strippers move on, once level meadows and cornfields have been converted to jumbled 
heaps of hardpan, barren clay from deep in the earth.  This hellish landscape is slow to support 
vegetation and years elapse before the yellow waste turns green again.  In the meantime immense 
quantities of dirt have crept into the sluggish.  
CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 311. 
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stretched to include surface mining in Appalachia.306  If reciprocity 
between mining companies and local communities existed, Appalachia 
would be a thriving economic community, highly populated, highly 
educated, and self-sufficient.  The economic data does not support that 
conclusion.307 
B. The Defense of Surface Mining 
Coal mining companies may claim SMCRA’s main purpose was to 
balance economic and environmental issues while supporting an 
important national source of energy.308  In 1977, SMCRA was passed 
with very little regard to science, if any.309  Only after forty years of 
accumulating scientific data could a legislature reasonably consider the 
impacts of surface mining and reclamation on Appalachia’s unique 
hydrological environment and surrounding communities.310  SMCRA 
expressly values Appalachian communities and does not suggest 
 
306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 
2012).  Society accepts the high likelihood and severity of risk associated with cars and airplanes 
as a matter of common usage.  Id.  But, should local communities in Appalachia disproportionately 
bare the harms of strip mining over the communities that burn the coal? 
307. 2010 Statistical Abstract, supra note 237. 
308. 30 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (2012).  While the coal industry may continue to claim this, many 
coal fired power plants have transitioned to natural gas.  Hal Harvey, Economics are  
Transitioning America From Coal to Clean, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2017, 8:00), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2017/03/02/economics-are-transitioning-america-
from-coal-to-clean/#531a0fd452b3.  The continued advancement in alternative and cleaner 
energies is slowly cutting into the nation’s reliance on coal.  Id.  A look into the identities of coal 
mining companies in Appalachia reveals that Indian, German, and other international coal mining 
companies are mining coal in Appalachia, much of which is exported. Frequently Asked Questions 
Where does the United States Export the Most Coal?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=66&t=2 [https://perma.cc/Z9QV-UE6D] (last updated 
Aug. 11, 2017).  The claim is not as true as it was in 1977.  See U.S. Coal Exports on Record Pace 
in 2012, Fueled by Steam Coal Growth, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 23, 2012), 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=66&t=2 [https://perma.cc/UHF5-GFD4] (noting The 
Netherlands, Brazil, and India are among the top destinations of U.S. coal exports). 
309. U.S. Department of Interior, Chronology of Major SMCRA-Related Events, OFF. OF 
SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, https://www.osmre.gov/lrg/chronlisting. 
shtm [https://perma.cc/P26A-LMST] (last updated Aug. 1, 2017).  One bright spot, SMCRA did 
set up the framework for supporting research to evaluate the consequences and best practices as 
responsibilities subsumed by the CWA.  Id. 
310. Id.  The provisions for reevaluation are clearly expressed in SMCRA, namely through 
its ability to declare a cessation order.  See id. (overviewing the Surface Mining Reclamation and 
Enforcement act). 
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protecting a source of energy should come at the cost of the people where 
the source exists.311   
It may be wise to consider Illustration 2 set forth in the Third 
Restatement.312  The hypothetical states a computer manufacturing 
company that is essential to the economy generates toxic chemicals 
during its manufacturing process.313  The chemicals are stored using 
reasonable care and according to public regulations.314  The nature of the 
chemicals makes it necessary for the barrels to be opened for periods of 
time.315  The dispersion of the toxic chemicals into the air is likely, but 
not certain, to reach the company’s neighbors.316  When and if the 
company’s neighbors become seriously ill, the company may be found 
liable for an abnormally dangerous activity.317  While jurisdictions are 
split on whether extensive government regulations make a finding that an 
activity is abnormally dangerous more difficult, some jurisdictions state 
government regulations make it easier to find the activity abnormally 
dangerous.318  An intermediate approach would propose that public 
regulations of the activity are irrelevant to the underlying issue of whether 
the activity is abnormally dangerous and whether the innocent, passive 
neighbor should bear the cost of injury.319  Government regulations 
identify mandated precautions and notify industries and citizens of the 
potential for risk and harm.320  Adherence to regulations does not 
 
311. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2012) (“The expansion of coal mining to meet the Nation’s 
energy needs makes even more urgent the establishment of appropriate standards to minimize 
damage to the environment and to productivity of the soil and to protect the health and safety of 
the public.”). 
312. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 illus. 2 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2012). 
313. Id. 
314. Id. § 20 cmt. k, illus. 2. 
315. Id. § 20 illus. 2. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. § 20 Reporters’ Notes cmt. h. 
319. Id. 
320. See Eli Combs et. al., When does Regulation Work?, YALE INSIGHTS (Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/when-does-regulation-work [https://perma.cc/B6QZ-79HH] 
(describing regulation in the investing context and its effects in a macro sense). 
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guarantee that the risk is removed or impute absolute immunity to 
industries operating within regulatory guidelines.321 
Courts have found some harms are unforeseeable, thereby severing the 
causation between the activity and the harm.322  Both the First and the 
Second Restatement agree that the defendant should recognize the risk of 
the activity.323  The American Law Institute suggests there should be “no 
liability if ‘the scientific state of knowledge at the time’ [of the 
defendant’s activity] gave no signal that the activity posed a substantial 
human health risk.”324  The spectrum of court decisions ranges from a 
showing of intentional exposure to the risk to actual knowledge of the 
risk.325  “[I]t is clear [that] strict liability will never be found unless the 
defendant is aware of the abnormally dangerous condition or 
activity. . . . Mere negligent failure to discover . . . is not 
enough . . . .”326  While the lack of scientific knowledge might have been 
a credible argument before 1977, the controversial nature of the activity, 
the polarized debates characterized by claims and counterclaims, and the 
duration of the debate cannot possibly provide the safety of ignorance to 
an actor in Appalachia’s coal industry.327  A coal company’s 
foreseeability of harm implies substantive speculation.328  However, the 
coal industry’s knowledge of the associated risks and harms of surface 
 
321. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 
2012). 
322. Id. § 20 cmt. i. 
323. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 520 cmt. g (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977); see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (stating 
inherent risk cannot be regarded as so unreasonable as to make it negligent to carry it on).  
324. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 Reporters’ Note cmt. 
i (AM. LAW INST. 2012). 
325. Id.  Compare McLane v. Nw. Natural Gas Co., 467 P.2d 635 (Or. 1970) (holding the 
basis for imposing strict liability was that defendants intentionally exposed the community to the 
risk) with Bolivar v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 789 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (holding strict 
liability requires defendant’s actual knowledge of the risk). 
326. KEETON ET AL., supra note 278, at 559. 
327. See Lung Cancer, supra note 37, at 4 (proclaiming that studies on the effects of coal-
mining and of scientific evidence preclude any claim or denials about the dangerous nature of the 
activity).  
328. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 Reporters’ Note cmt. 
i at 255 (AM. LAW INST. 2012); see Perez v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 883 P.2d 424, 
426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (agreeing liability rests upon the intentional doing of that which a person 
knows may cause loss to another and if they present foreseeable and significant risks of harm). 
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mining could prove detrimental in front of an Appalachian judge who 
could objectively consider the actions of a reasonable actor.329   
The Restatements are persuasive authority and non-binding on the 
courts.330  The purpose of the Restatements was to express the current 
state of the law.331  The state of law may reflect continuity between 
jurisdictions or stark contrasts.332  Most jurisdictions have concluded 
blasting is an abnormally dangerous activity under the Second 
Restatement.333  Furthermore, most jurisdictions in the United States, 
including Kentucky, endorse the Second Restatement of Torts § 520’s 
analysis of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.334  A 
review of recent case law reveals that the District of Columbia, Maryland, 
Vermont, Nebraska, and Connecticut recognize the Third Restatement as 
part of their analysis of negligent infliction of emotional distress.335  The 
 
329. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 Reporters’ 
Note cmt. i at 255 (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“According to Perez v. Southern Pacific Transportation 
Co., 883 P.2d 424 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993), the test concerns those dangers of which ‘the person 
knows or should[,] in the exercise of ordinary care[,] know.’”). 
330. See BONITA K. ROBERTS & LINDA L. SCHLUETER, LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE: 
PATTERNS AND PRACTICE 125 (Matthew Bender & Co. eds., 7th ed. 2015) (explaining the 
Restatements are persuasive, non-binding authority, because they lack legislative sanction). 
331. Id. 
332. See id. (indicating the Restatements provide thorough case analysis on both sides of an 
issue). 
333. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 20 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 
2012). 
334. See id. § 20 cmt. h (indicating courts across the nation have adopted the Restatement 
Second’s interpretation of “reasonable care,” while utilizing the integrated approach under the First 
Restatement).  Kentucky has failed to recognize the standard of strict liability, preferring the 
negligence standard.  See Spivey v. Sheeler, 514 S.W.2d 667, 670–71(Ky. 1974) (finding a father 
negligent after his juvenile son shot another juvenile by obtaining key from father’s locked gun 
case); Styles v. Eblen, 436 S.W.2d 505–06 (Ky. 1969) (finding oil lessee was negligent for leaving 
electric lines connected to power after electrocution of landowners hogs); Carr v. Ky. Utilities Co., 
301 S.W.2d 894, 898–99 (Ky. 1957) (denying recovery under a theory of contributory negligence 
and supervening causation for electrocution injuries). 
335. See, e.g., Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 802 (D.C. 2015) 
(applying the Third Restatement and rejecting the need for special rules, such as designating a zone 
of danger, to guard against unlimited liability); Treibt v. On Tract Karting, Inc., No. 
DBDCV146015298S, 2015 WL 719633, at *2, *4–5 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2015) (declining to find 
strict liability under the Third Restatement when the injured voluntarily engaged in the activity); 
Wilson v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1524 Sept. Term 2014, 2015 WL 6549167, at *7 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. Aug. 13, 2015) (stating the Third Restatement requires proof that abnormally dangerous 
activity caused physical harm to recover under strict liability theory); Vincent v. DeVries, 72 A.3d 
886 (Vt. 2013) (following the Third Restatement’s modern trend allowing recovery for serious 
emotional distress absent physical injury when harm is of such a personal and emotional nature); 
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federal districts of Nevada and the Virgin Islands have also considered 
the Third Restatement’s analysis for strict liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities.336  Slowly, the Third Restatement’s views on strict 
liability are being considered by federal and state courts.  
In Roeder v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,337  the U.S. District Court of 
Nevada applied the Third Restatement and denied a motion to dismiss 
after identifying a number of approaches to the abnormally dangerous 
activity of mining.338  In Roeder, the court determined the likelihood of 
harm flowing from open-pit copper mining to be substantial despite the 
activity’s value to the community.339  In particular, the court identified 
potential harm in the form of serious health issues resulting from the 
seepage of stored chemicals and waste materials from the mining process 
into the groundwater or released into the air.340  Because this potential 
harm could not be eliminated, dismissal of a strict liability claim was not 
appropriate.341  The U.S. District Court of Nevada refused summary 
judgment for the alleged seepage of toxic chemicals into the water supply, 
holding that strict liability was available in Nevada for mining that 
resulted in toxic chemicals entering the local water supply.342   
 
Ginapp v. City of Bellevue, 809 N.W.2d 487, 492–93 (Neb. 2012) (holding the defendant used 
reasonable care and therefore, under the Third Restatement, was not liable for plaintiff’s injuries). 
336. Frontani v. Marriot Ownership Resorts (St. Thomas), Inc., Civil No. 2015-22, 2016 
WL 1092523, at 2 (V.I. 2016); Roeder v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 3:11–cv–00105–RCJ–RAM, 
2011 WL 4048515, at 8–9 (D. Nev. 2011). 
337. Roeder, 2011 WL 4048515. 
338. Id. at *5.  
The Court will deny the motion to dismiss the strict liability claim. Strict liability is available in this 
case under either the factor-based approach of the Restatement (Second), which the Nevada 
Supreme Court currently approves, or under the element-based approach of the Restatement (Third), 





342. See id. 
The present case is most analogous to the Ventron case from New Jersey, and in fact a relevant 
treatise uses that case as an example of strict liability in the toxic tort context. See Am. Bar Ass’n, 
Section of Env’t, Energy, & Res., Toxic Tort Litigation 31–32 (D. Alan Rudlin ed.2007). Professor 
Dobbs likewise notes that “[s]trict liability for accumulation, escape, percolation, or disposal of 
[toxic] wastes seems to be especially appropriate.” 2 Dobbs, supra, § 348, at 957. Open-pit copper 
mining likely had a great value to the community and was likely appropriate to the area of the Mine 
Site when it was ongoing, and open-pit copper mining may be common in Nevada (or may have 
been so during the relevant time period). However, it was not likely a common activity for “many 
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Lawyers in Appalachia should plead that the Second Restatement fails 
to properly balance the interests of industry and community citing to 
Roeder and other jurisdictions applying the Third Restatement § 20.  
Lawyers should pose well-founded and factually-sufficient pleadings for 
strict liability claims under the Second and Third Restatement for 
abnormally dangerous activities along with standard negligence and 
nuisance claims in an effort to preserve objections and build factually 
sufficient records for appellate challenges.   
VIII.    JURISPRUDENCE AND THE NECESSITY TO CHANGE COURSE 
Precedents by their nature are subject to judicial discretion based on 
the facts judges choose to emphasize or ignore.343  Imprecise definitions 
of “environment,” which may be broad or narrow depending on the 
subjective interpretation, combined with a court’s findings of the 
accumulating scientific evidence of community harm should play a larger 
part in the transformation of the common law in Appalachia. 
A. History of American Common Law 
Undisputedly, America’s legal origins begin with the adoption of the 
English common law system, but from the very beginning adherence to 
stare decisis and deference to judicial precedent has been challenged 
throughout American legal history.344  Since the inception of the federal 
system, advocates questioned the common law’s ability to replace the 
legislative process that authorizes statutes expressing the will of the 
people.345  Early adherents to the English common law equating use and 
 
people in the community.” Moreover, open pit mining likely involves the use of many chemicals 
and the storage of many waste materials that will inevitably seep into the ground when stored in 
outdoor piles, as Plaintiffs allege, creating a high degree of risk of harm to people and land via heavy 
metals contamination. The harm is likely to be great, causing serious health problems, such as 
cancer. Finally, under the Restatement (Third) and Rylands, the risk of such seepage cannot be 
eliminated through reasonable care. In order to be profitable, a mine must presumably create 
abnormally vast piles of waste that cannot reasonably be isolated from the surrounding air and soil. 
Whatever is in these waste piles will inevitably diffuse into the surrounding environment. The Court 
will not dismiss the strict liability claim. 
343. See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 
at 8–9, 25 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1977) (recognizing judges would use a “variety of legal 
principles” by which judges would use to make their own decision; implying discretion). 
344. Id. at 8–9, 27. 
345. See id. at 12–13 (stating that in United States v. Worrall (1798), Justice Chase 
explained, “the whole of the common law of England has been nowhere introduced . . . the common 
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custom with binding natural laws were disfavored by post-revolutionary 
concepts of popular sovereignty.346   
American jurisprudence made many alterations, revisions, and 
announcements of independence from the common law during the 1800s 
that reflected not only America’s burgeoning independence,347 but also 
the influence of the Industrial Age on legal theories.348  A recurring 
theme of nineteenth-century American jurisprudence is the accounting 
for the social utility of the actors as a countervailing factor in considering 
previously perceived absolutes in contract, property, and tort.349  The 
common law’s strict duty of care was replaced by negligence, which 
theorized that injuries from socially useful conduct were not compensable 
unless the actor was careless.350  A property owner’s right to prevent 
others from interfering with one’s quiet enjoyment subsided to the 
Industrial Age’s presumption that property ownership conferred a right 
 
law of one State, is not the common law of another”).  Therefore, there could be no general common 
law of America.  Id. at 12. Horowitz further states, “judges were looking to the legislature for 
authority to impose common law standards in criminal cases.”  Id. at 13. 
346. See id at 25 (stating many questioned the deference to a judge’s legislative function 
and characterized these decisions as arbitrary).  Chief Justice Nathaniel Chipman insisted a 
balancing test should be observed when recognizing the authority of the common law:  
Instead of entertaining a blind veneration for the ancient rules, maxims, and precedents, we [sh]ould 
learn to distinguish between those which are founded on the principles of human nature in society, 
which are permanent and universal, and those which are dictated by the circumstances, policy, 
manners, morals, and religion of the age.  
Id. 
347. See Oliver W. Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (“It 
is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV.”). 
348. See HOROWITZ, supra note 343, at 71–78 (stating a general movement limiting the 
rights of property owners from receiving consequential damages for injuries caused by government 
was redefined in the age of the social state).  While common law principles of just compensation 
could never be properly disposed, the courts stated “[w]e must have factories, machinery, dams, 
canals, and railroads.”  Id.  American courts recognized a distinct difference between private and 
public nuisance claims, severely limiting the effectiveness of such claims against private actors 
involved in public works.  Id.  Courts weighed the social utility of the alleged venture, resulting in 
mitigated costs and, in some instances, silencing the claimant.  Id. 
349. Id.  This shift not only reflects the influence of business interest and their access to the 
courts, but also an independence of American jurisprudential history that allows the common law 
to develop within the spectrum of prevailing norms.  Stretching the boundaries when social utility 
requires or retracting when the course presents itself ill-advised.   
350. See id. at 78–81 (describing shifts in policy conferring immunity from nuisance actions 
on private and government actors engaged in economic development). 
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to develop one’s property regardless of potential injury to others.351  The 
legal concept that a contract is an express recognition of a present 
agreement bound by adequate consideration was set aside due to the 
market economy’s need for the contract to serve as the basis of future 
agreements and expected returns.352  In some cases, local custom 
collided with contract law and commercial interests, leaving most 
American jurisdictions with precedents relying on nineteenth-century 
rules of construction for strict contract interpretation.353  It cannot be 
claimed with any sincerity that America’s unbending subservience to 
stare decisis is unremitting.  America’s common law system is 
characterized by the ebb and flow of new ideas and old principles 
influenced by prevailing social norms.354   
B. Precedents: The Building Blocks of Stare Decisis 
A precedent is an authoritative legal principle created by a judicial 
decision and the reasoning supporting the decision which has the force of 
law.355  Common law’s authority is not negated even if a court’s final 
ruling is supported by questionable reasoning.356  A plain reading of 
SMCRA would suggest the conflicting interests between local 
communities and the coal mining industry are balanced equally, however, 
only jurisdictions that employ surface mining as a means of extraction 
will apply and interpret the law.357  Appalachian jurisdictions have 
balanced these interests showing a greater deference to coal mining’s 
economic importance at the expense of environmental and community 
 
351. See id. at 98–99 (describing the legal community’s attempt to limit the scope of just 
compensation as a “phenomenon of industrialization”). 
352. See id. at 167 (stating eighteenth century contract law did not fulfill the expectations 
of the commercial classes, as it did not guarantee the merchant the express value of his bargain).  
The law only guaranteed, at most, specific performance.  Id. 
353. See id. at 201 (stating the triumph of contract and objective theory in the first half of 
the 1800s allowed parties to present commercial custom as the implied and agreed upon terms of 
“contract interpretation”). 
354. Id. at 12–14. 
355. Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 
161 (1930) (citing SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 201 (7th ed. 1924)). 
356. Id. at 164 .  For example, Goodhart suggests modern tort law is the result of poor 
arguments and property law following incorrect interpretation of history.  Despite faults in the 
underlying reasoning of those doctrines of law, the law is nonetheless authoritative. Id. at 164. 
357. 30 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (2012) (describing the necessary balance between providing a 
reliable source of energy and protecting the environment). 
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interests.358  Interpretation of legislation is an important power of the 
court.359  Judges engaged in legislative interpretation follow a checklist 
of considerations more so than any hard and fast rules, especially when 
both the purpose and language of the law are unclear.360  However, 
SMCRA’s language is clear, obliging a judge to truly balance the 
competing interests.361 
When creating precedent, a judge may contour the scope of the holding 
by distinguishing material facts from immaterial facts.362  Omitted facts 
and impliedly immaterial facts must be considered immaterial.363  A 
court may always avoid precedent by finding a material fact in a current 
matter that is distinguishable from the material facts that contoured the 
previous precedent.364  Applying this method of distinction, a judge’s 
judicial notice or a finding of the health impacts in Appalachian 
communities as the result of surface mining would place a claim of strict 
liability in uncharted waters—free of controlling precedents that ignored 
community harm in balancing environmental and economic concerns.365 
 
358. See e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 
2009) (vacating and reversing the District Court’s declaratory relief to OVEC holding Aracoma 
lacked authority to permit discharge into fills distinguished as “waters of the United States”). 
359. Richard A. Posner, Legislation and its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431, 
441 (1989). 
360. See id. at 441–50 (describing the benefits and shortcomings of a number of approaches 
and canons governing statutory interpretation).  Posner promotes a pragmatic approach to 
interpreting legislation when purposive interpretation fails.  Id. at 449–50.  
361. 30 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (2012).  See Posner, supra note 359, at 449–50 (stating the purpose 
and motivation are difficult to distinguish for special interests and expressing that laws represent 
the decisions of many distinct representatives with conflicting or complicated reasons for passing 
the legislation). 
362. See Goodhart, supra note 355, at 173 (indicating judges will include facts that are not 
essential to the judgment, “leaving it for future generations to determine whether . . . these facts 
constitute a part of the ratio decidendi.”). 
363. See id. at 169–75  
Under these circumstances there are two possible explanations for the omission: (1) the fact was 
considered by the court but was found to be immaterial, or (2) the fact in the record was not 
considered by the court as it was not called to its attention by counsel or was for some other reason 
overlooked.  
As a general rule, material facts do not escape the attention of the court.  Goodhart notes the burden 
of showing a material fact is overlooked is a heavy one.  Id. at 169. 
364. Id. at 181–82 (describing a difference in material facts between Rylands v. Fletcher 
and Nichols v. Marsland that permitted the Fletcher court to avoid application of the principle 
established in Rylands). 
365. 30 U.S.C. § 1202(f) (2012). 
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IX.    CONCLUSION 
America prospered on “cheap” coal, while Appalachia was abandoned 
to the wills of absentee interests.366  In-stream settlement ponds have 
been found to be necessary in Appalachia,367 but it is hard to believe this 
practice can be considered a “best technology.”368  Any child building 
an earthen dam on a street after a moderate rain comprehends this 
exercise in futility.  The consequences of reclamation and settlement 
ponds are apparent in the flooding, polluted wells, and polluted streams, 
as well as the widespread health impacts which commonly characterize 
Appalachian communities.369  Rarely have the environmental costs of 
surface mining been framed as community health consequences.370   
There are thousands of settlement ponds across Appalachia.371  Some 
hold billions of gallons of toxic coal slurry.372  Often, bankrupt coal 
companies abandon their performance bonds and any effort to reclaim the 
land.373  In some cases, bonds are insufficient to complete the 
reclamation of the mine site.374   
 
366. See RASMUSSEN, supra note 38, at 1–4 (reporting the transition from farming to mining 
and timbering was due to speculators and absentees); CAUDILL, supra note 26, at 71–74 (stating 
mining companies flourished by cheaply purchasing mineral interests at the expense of surface 
owners); Tom D. Miller, Route 99 Classic Example of Coal Firms’ Influence, THE HERALD-
ADVERTISER & THE HERALD-DISPATCH, reprinted in WHO OWNS WEST VIRGINIA?, supra note 5, 
at 2 (highlighting absentee landowners pay minimal property taxes while extracting rich mineral 
deposits). 
367. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 186, 216 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (describing the use of sediment ponds instill stability).  
368. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(10)(B)(i) (2012). 
369. Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 27, at 547; MCAULEY & KOZAR, supra note 226, at 2, 
11; Shiber, supra note 4, at 335–38. 
370. See Hendryx & Ahern, supra note 27, at 547 (suggesting mortality in coal mining areas 
is caused in part by environmental degradation).  
371. Juliet Eiperin & Steven Mufson, Many Coal Sludge Impoundments Have Weak Walls, 
Federal Study Says, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ 
health-science/many-coal-sludge-impoundments-have-weak-walls-federal-study-says/2013/04/24 
/76c5be2a-acf9-11e2-a8b9-2a63d75b5459_story.html?utm_term=.b8cb307b0a8d [https://perma. 
cc/56W7-8F4G].  There are 596 toxic sludge ponds in 21 states, with 114 in West Virginia. 
372. Residents of Southern Appalachia, supra note 299. 
373. Interview with Mary V. Cromer, supra note 98. 
374. Id. 
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Reclamation, as defined in SMCRA, has proven insufficient for its 
intended purpose.375  Enforcement and funding for state agencies have 
been historically and ubiquitously lacking.376  While Congress intended 
SMCRA and CWA to protect the environment through state and federal 
cooperation, underfunded state agencies fail to properly execute their 
mission.377  In some instances, coal companies provided fraudulent data 
for years on pollutants from settlement ponds entering the intermittent 
stream, and agencies charged with the task were not reviewing the 
collected data.378   
Imposing strict liability on surface mining in Appalachia would 
provide relief for communities suffering from severe health 
consequences and justice for innocent bystanders.379  Furthermore, the 
threat of strict liability as a viable cause of action would encourage the 
coal mining industry to look soberly at its best practices.  Something they 
have been unwilling or improperly encouraged to do.  A decline in the 
permanent destruction of one of the most biologically diverse ecosystems 
in the world would allow other economic interests to develop in 
Appalachian communities, thereby expanding the choices of 
employment.380  A finding of strict liability against mining companies 
employing surface mining and harming Appalachia’s surrounding 
communities will lead to more sustainable practices in conventional 
 
375. See id. (stating the common practices of the mining industry have proven to be 
ineffective in meeting the standards of state regulations). 
376. See id. (emphasizing that the Kentucky Legislature continues to cut the funding for 
inspectors and monitoring equipment at mine sites). 
377. See Estep, supra note 23 (noting Kentucky has given up more than $5.5 million in 
federal funding). 
378. See Interview with Mary V. Cromer, supra note 98 (speaking of a case she was 
involved in where a mining company falsified reports over a number of years)  A single report was 
copied and presented repeatedly as an original and true description of pollutants entering an 
intermittent stream.  Id. 
379. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PHYSI. & EMOT. HARM § 519 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977) (stating strict liability will be imposed from harm caused by abnormally dangerous 
activities). 
380. Adele C. Morris, Build a Better Future for Coal Workers and Their Communities, 
ECON. STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, 7–8, 25 (2016).  The health and economic consequences playing 
out in Central Appalachia could be dealt with and a diversified economy could take hold for the 
first time in Appalachia. See id. (explaining utilization of coal alternatives would be economically 
beneficial). 
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underground mining that would employ many more people and preserve 
the proud history of mining in Appalachia.381 
The CWA mandates that states apply their own environmental policies 
that meet EPA standards and enforce sound policy that protects 
communities near surface mining sites.382  The Final Ruling on 
Definition of Waters of United States may be rolled back under the 
current administration,383 but the profound, substantive nexus analysis 
as applied to waters of the United States established in Rapanos and Solid 
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County remains.384  Courts may 
continue to encourage the vital understanding of the interdependence 
between waters, communities, and long-term economic sustainability by 
applying the nexus test.    
The common law is not static.  The continuing evolution of the 
common law, the limited scope of regional precedents based on 
undiscovered facts, and the recognition of special interest influence in 
legislation should inform and encourage judges at all levels in Appalachia 
to look deeper into surface mining’s relationship to surrounding 
communities.  Recent findings that coal companies and state regulators 
have been knowingly falsifying water analysis records385 should 
embolden judges to realize that the purposes of federal regulations have 
been thwarted by companies that seem to enjoy special privileges and, 
often, “immunity.”386  A recognition of surface mining in Appalachia as 
an abnormally dangerous activity would force the actual facts of this epic 
story to be properly litigated, provide the incentive necessary to force 
substantive and necessary change in the coal mining industry, and 
simultaneously preserve the treasure of Appalachia for all Americans.  
 
 
381. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2012) (“it is, therefore, essential to the national interest to 
insure the existence of an expanding and economically healthy underground coal mining industry”) 
(emphasis added). 
382. See 22 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2012) (naming the Environmental Protection Agency as the 
“Administrator” of the public participation in development, revision, and enforcement of any 
regulation).  
383. H.R. 1105, 115th Cong. (2017).   
384. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. 
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
385. Interview with Mary V. Cromer, supra note 98. 
386. See id. (stating that due to the lack of state oversight, companies feel emboldened to 
continue in practices that fail to meet state standards, unless they are caught in the act and held 
accountable . 
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